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NOTE
PERSONHOOD UNDER THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE: A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF
THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION REFORM
AND IMMIGRANT RESPONSIBILITY
ACT OF 1996
David M. Grablet
No person shall . .. be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... 1
Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as
an alien denied entry is concerned.2
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INTRODUCTION
On September 30, 1996, President Clinton signed the Illegal Im-
migration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
("JIRIRA") . Characterized by one observer as "the most diverse, divi-
sive and draconian immigration law enacted since the Chinese Exclu-
sion Act of 1882,"4 the legislation aims primarily at stemming the tide
of illegal immigration into the United States. 5 Included in the
IIRIRA's broad attack on illegal immigration are sections providing
for an expedited removal procedure6 and for the criminal prosecu-
tion of aliens who re-enter or attempt to re-enter the United States
within a certain period of time after being expeditiously removed.7
These new procedures raise serious constitutional questions. By
allowing an individual immigration inspector to make an unreview-
3 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 [hereinafter
URIRA], Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
8 U.S.C.).
4 Dan Danilov, U.S. Courts Offer No Protection from Latest Immigration Law, SEArrE
POSr-INTELUGENCER, Dec. 17, 1996, at A19.
5 As commentator Dan Carney observed:
Much of the political endgame over legal immigrants and their benefits
distracted attention from the bill's main thrust: clamping down on illegal
immigration. There are an estimated 4 million illegal immigrants in the
country and their ranks grow by about 300,000 a year. The new law aims to
reduce those numbers.
Dan Carney, As White House Calls Shots, Illegal Alien Bill Clears: Republicans, Eager To Leave
Town, Drop Many Provisions on Public Benefits, 54 CONG. Q. 2864, 2864 (1996).
6 Immigration and Nationality Act [hereinafter INA] § 235(b)(1), 8 U.S.C-.
§ 1225(b) (1) (West Supp. 1997).
7 INA § 276, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1326.
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able, unappealable determination on an alien's admissibility,8 the ex-
pedited removal procedure potentially violates aliens' due process
rights. Furthermore, by attempting to use that unreviewable, unap-
pealable removal order as a basis for a criminal prosecution, 9 and by
barring collateral attack of that order in the criminal prosecution, 10
the subsequent prosecution procedure flies in the face of Supreme
Court precedent establishing aliens' constitutional rights in criminal
prosecutions.
This Note tackles these constitutional issues. Part I provides defi-
nitions for the alien classifications that are relevanc to the constitu-
tional analysis. Part II sets forth the mechanics of the expedited
removal and subsequent prosecution procedures. Part Il traces a
century of Supreme Court jurisprudence on aliens' procedural due
process rights. In so doing, Part I establishes that the Supreme
Court's traditional approach treats some aliens as nonpersons for due
process purposes."
Part IV uses the traditional approach to examine the constitution-
ality of the expedited removal procedure. Part IV analyzes the expe-
dited removal procedure as it applies to (1) initially arriving aliens;
(2) returning aliens; and (3) aliens present in the United States. The
traditional analysis concludes that the expedited removal of initially
arriving and returning aliens is clearly constitutional, and that the ex-
pedited removal of present aliens is a close constitutional question. In
reaching these conclusions, Part IV illustrates that the traditional ap-
proach's method of analysis fails to comport with mainstream, con-
temporary due process doctrine, and leads to troubling constitutional
conclusions.
Refusing to accept the shortcomings of the traditional approach,
Part V argues that the IIRIRA provides the Court with the ideal oppor-
tunity to jettison the traditional due process framework in favor of a
new and improved approach. This new approach-the "stake the-
ory'-would afford aliens more due process protection, and, more im-
8 See infra Part HA
9 See infra Part H.B.
10 See infra Part II.B.
1 Charles Weisselberg uses the person/nonperson distinction in his recent immigra-
tion law article. Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention ofAliens: Lessons from the
Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 933, 1033 (1995) ("This Article has
explored... the notion that excludable aliens are not 'persons' within the meaning of the
Due Process Clause. It has offered several reasons why all human beings at or inside our
gates must be deemed 'persons' and why they must be afforded meaningful access to our
courts."); see also David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community:
Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. Prrr. L. REv. 165, 176 (1983) ("The Knauff-Mezei doctrine
comes close to saying that even though the fifth amendment due process protection ap-
plies to 'persons,' we simply do not regard excludable aliens as falling within that
category.").
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portantly, would bring immigration law into step with mainstream,
contemporary due process doctrine.
Part VI goes beyond the expedited removal procedure to ex-
amine the IIRIRA's procedure for the subsequent prosecution of any
expeditiously removed alien. Applying the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Mendoza-Lapez,12 Part VI concludes that the subse-
quent prosecution of any alien for the violation of an expedited re-
moval order is unconstitutional. By treating all aliens subject to
prosecution as persons for due process purposes, Mendoza-Lopez fur-
ther supports adoption of the stake theory as a means of analyzing
aliens' procedural due process claims.
I
Ti CAST OF CHA A=Rs
To engage in meaningful discourse on the IIRIRA's constitution-
ality, one must understand immigration law's 13 different classifications
of aliens. Unfortunately, the IIRIRA changed the classifications.
Thus, an understanding of both the traditional and the new vocabu-
lary is a prerequisite to any constitutional analysis of the IIR A's new
procedures.
Traditional immigration parlance classified aliens who did not
qualify to be in the United States as either deportable or excludable.14
The distinction between the two classifications depended on whether
the alien had entered the country: those aliens who had entered were
deportable, and those who sought entry were excludable.15 The labels
referred to the procedures used to expel the alien or to keep the alien
from entering the country.16 The government could remove aliens
who had entered the country only through deportation proceedings,
while aliens seeking entry had "their admissibility determined in ex-
clusion proceedings."' 7 As Part I discusses in detail, the exclusion-
deportation distinction acquired constitutional significance: deport-
able aliens were treated as "persons" under the Due Process Clause,
whereas excludable aliens were denied due process protection. 18
12 481 U.S. 828 (1987).
13 For purposes of this Note, immigration regulation and immigration law refer to
"the body of law governing the admission and the expulsion of aliens." Stephen H. Legom-
sky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary CongreTsional Power, 1984 Sup. CT. REv. 255,
256. So defined, immigration law can "be distinguished from the more general law of
aliens' rights and obligations." Id.
14 See DAVID A. MARTIN, MAJOR ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION LAW 9-10 (1987).
15 See id.
16 See id.
17 Id.
18 See infra Part III.
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The IIRIRA eliminated the traditional deportable and excludable
classifications. 19 The new law classifies aliens who do not qualify to be
in the United States as either deportable or inadmissible.20 The distinc-
tion between deportable and inadmissible turns on whether the alien has
been inspected and admitted.2 ' Aliens who have been inspected and
admitted but are no longer entitled to be in the country are deport-
able.22 Aliens who have been neither inspected nor admitted and are
not entitled to be in the country are inadmissible.23 This Note focuses
on the inadmissible alien category, which is divisible into three sub-
groups. Two of these subgroups, "initially arriving aliens" and "re-
turning aliens," fall into the inadmissible category because they stand
at the border waiting to be inspected and admitted.2 4 The third sub-
group of inadmissibles are those aliens who have entered the United
States without being inspected and admitted.2 5 Throughout this
Note, this third group is referred to as "present aliens."26
One other alien classification, which the new law has left intact,
deserves discussion. "Pennanent resident aliens" are aliens who have
been "lawfully admitted for permanent residence."27 Although per-
manent resident aliens are not subject to expedited removal, 28 they
are relevant to this Note's analysis because they have received special
constitutional treatment under the Supreme Court's traditional ap-
proach.2 9 Having reviewed the terms relevant to a constitutional anal-
ysis of the new procedures, the discussion now turns to the procedures
themselves.
19 See 2 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 64.01 [1] (1997).
The IIRIRA provides for "a single removal proceeding, rather than separate 'exclusion'
and 'deportation' proceedings, as provided under prior law." Id.
20 INA § 240(e) (2), 8 U.S.CA § 1229a(e) (2) (West Supp. 1997).
21 See id. For the definition of "admission," see INA § 101 (a) (13), 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1101 (a) (13).
22 See INA § 240(e) (2) (B), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229a(e) (2) (B).
23 See INA § 240(e) (2) (A), 8 U.S.G.A § 1229a(e) (2) (A).
24 SeeINA§ 101(a) (13), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(13). The analysis below further divides
the initially arriving category into immigrants, nonimmigrants, and undocumented aliens.
See infra text accompanying note 179; infra note 180.
25 SeeINA § 101 (a) (13), 8 U.S.CA. § 1101(a) (13); see also 2 GORDON ET AL., supranote
19, at § 64.01(2] (stating that "those who were not lawfully admitted-whether they are
physically inside or outside the United States .... are considered to be seeking admission,
and must prove that they are admissible").
26 These aliens are sometimes referred to as "EWIs," which stands for aliens who have
"entered without inspection." 7 GORDON ET Al.., supra note 19, § 71.04[3] [a] (discussing
aliens who have "entered without inspection (EWI)", and recognizing the potential appli-
cation of the JIRIRA's expedited removal procedure to EWIs).
27 INA § 101(a) (13) (C), 8 U.S.CA § 1101(a) (13) (C).
28 See infra note 32 (noting that, under the IIRIRA, permanent residents are entitled
to additional procedures before removal from the United States).
29 See infra notes 81-95 and accompanying text.
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II
TBE NEw PROCEDURES
A. Expedited Removal
The IIRIRA vests the power of expedited removal in the hands of
individual immigration officers.30 Under the relevant provisions of
the new law, an officer who determines, on the basis of misrepresenta-
tion, lack of documents, or both, that an alien is inadmissible "shall
order the alien removed from the United States without further hear-
ing or review."3' Three categories of aliens are potential targets for
the expedited removal procedure: (1) initially arriving aliens; (2) re-
turning aliens;3 2 and (3) inadmissible aliens already in the United
States who have not been admitted or paroled 33 into the country, and
"who ha[ve] not affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an immigra-
tion officer, that [they have] been physically present in the United
30 See INA § 235(b), 8 U.S.CA. § 1225(b).
31 Id. For an explanation of "misrepresentation," see INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(i), 8
U.S. .A 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). That section provides that "[a]ny alien who, by fraud or
wilfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure (or has sought to procure or has
procured) a visa, other documentation, or admission into the United States or other bene-
fit provided under this chapter is inadmissible." Id.
Documentation requirements for arriving aliens are set forth in INA
§ 212(a) (7) (A) (i), 8 U.S.CA 1182(a) (7) (A) (i), which provides that
any immigrant at the time of application for admission... who is not in
possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border
crossing identification card, or other valid entry document required by this
chapter, and a valid unexpired passport, or other suitable travel document,
or document of identity and nationality if such document is required... is
inadmissible.
Id.
Federal regulations make clear, in the case of an alien who is inadmissible on the basis
of misrepresentation or lack of documents or both and is also inadmissible on any other
ground, that an expedited removal order can only be based on the misrepresentation or
lack of documents grounds. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b) (3) (1998).
32 See INA § 235(b), 8 U.S.CA § 1225(b). The HIRRA provides additional proce-
dures for the following groups of returning and arriving aliens: (1) returning permanent
resident aliens, returning refugees, or returning asylees; (2) arriving nonresident aliens
who indicate a fear of persecution or an intent to apply for asylum; and (3) aliens who
"[are] . . .native[s] or citizen[s] of a country in the Western Hemisphere with whose
government the United States does not have full diplomatic relations [i.e., Cuba] and who
arrives by aircraft." INA §235(b)(1)(C), (b)(1)(A)(ii), (b)(1)(F), 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1225(b) (1) (C), (b) (1) (A) (ii), (b) (1) (F).
This Note concerns only arriving and returning aliens who are not entitled to addi-
tional procedures. Thus, the aforementioned groups of arriving and returning aliens who
are entitled to additional procedures fall outside the scope of this Note.
33 The term "parole" refers to the process by which aliens who have been denied
admission to the United States are allowed to enter the country "despite some unwaivable
ground of inadmissibility." MARTrn, supra note 14, at 11. Under the "'entry fiction,'" Weis-
selberg, supra note 11, at 951, these aliens "remain constructively at the border throughout
their stay, no matter where they travel." MARrIN, supra note 14, at 11. Looking to the entry
fiction for support, the Supreme Court has held that parolees have no procedural due
process rights. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958).
1998] 825
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States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date
of the determination of inadmissibility under [the expedited removal
provisions]."34
The most striking aspect of the new procedure is that expedited
removal orders are neither administratively35 nor judicially36 review-
able. Thus, an arriving or present inadmissible alien who has been
ordered expeditiously removed has no recourse.37 As Part II.B dis-
cusses below, this bar on judicial review acquires additional signifi-
34 INA § 235 (b) (1) (A) (iii) (II), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b) (1)(A) (iii) (II). This Note refers
to this alien group as "present aliens." See supra notes 23, 25-26 and accompanying text.
Only action by the Attorney General can trigger the application of the expedited removal
procedures to present aliens. See INA § 235(b) (1) (A) (iii) (I), 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1225(b) (1) (A) (iii) (I). The Attorney General has not yet taken such action. See INS,
EOIR Publish Interim Regulations Implementing 1996 Ac ITRrPmR REL.ASES (Fed. Publica-
tions Inc. Wash., D.C.), Mar. 10, 1997, at 355 (observing "the INS's decision... not to
apply at this time the expedited removal provisions to aliens in the U.S. who have not been
admitted or paroled and who cannot establish continuous physical presence in the U.S. for
the previous two years"). Congress, on the other hand, appears to be anxious to apply
expedited removal to present aliens. See Letter from Lamar Smith, Chairman, House Sub-
committee on Immigration and Claims, to Richard Sloan, Director, Policy Directives and
Instructions Branch, Immigration and Naturalization Service 7-8 (Feb. 3, 1997):
We understand that for practical reasons, it may not be advisable at this
point to apply expedited removal to all aliens who cannot establish 2 years
of residence in the United States. However, the discretionary authority
should not be kept "in reserve" for emergencies; it should be an ordinary
tool of enforcement against illegal migration, directed specifically at recent
illegal entrants.
Id. (making argument in comments submitted in response to a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking).
35 INA § 235(b) (1) (A) (i), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b) (1) (A) (i) (stating that upon determi-
nation that an arriving alien is inadmissible "the officer shall order the alien removed from
the United States without further hearing or review") (emphasis added); INA § 235(b) (1) (C),
8 U.S.CA § 1225(b) (1) (C) (providing that a removal order entered against an arriving
nonresident alien who does not claim refugee or asylum status "is not subject to adminis-
trative appeal").
36 "[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to review-(i) except as provided in subsection
(e) of this section, any individual determination or to entertain any other cause or claim
arising from or relating to the implementation or operation of [a summary removal or-
der]. . . ." INA § 242(a) (2) (A), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(a) (2) (A).
Subsection (e) (5) provides that
[i]n determining whether an alien has been ordered removed under sec-
tion 235(b) (1) .... the court's inquiry shall be limited to whether such an
order in fact was issued and whether it relates to the petitioner. There shall
be no review of whether the alien is actually inadmissible or entitled to any relieffrom
removal
INA § 242(e) (5), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(e) (5) (emphasis added).
The IIRIRA does retain limited habeas corpus review. INA § 242(e) (2), 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1252(e) (2). Under the terms of the statute, however, habeas relief is available only to
aliens who can prove permanent resident status. Id. Because this Note is concerned with
only initially arriving, returning, and present aliens who do not claim to be permanent
residents, see supra note 32, habeas corpus review under the IIRIRA does not provide an
avenue for judicial review of the validity of individual expedited removal orders issued
against the aliens who are the focal point of this Note.
37 See INA § 242(a) (2) (A), 8 U.S.CA. § 1252(a) (2)(A).
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cance when an expedited removal order forms the basis for a
subsequent prosecution.
B. Subsequent Prosecution
The mechanics of the subsequent prosecution procedure are
straightforward. Under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1326, any alien who has been or-
dered expeditiously removed and who subsequently "enters, attempts
to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States" is subject to
felony prosecution.38 Prosecution for the violation of an outstanding
immigration order is not a novel concept; immigration law has pro-
vided for such prosecutions for forty-five years.3 9 The IIRIRA, how-
ever, adds a new wrinkle to subsequent prosecution by preventing
collateral attack of an expedited removal order in a § 1326 prosecu-
tion.40 The new expedited removal section provides: "In any action
brought against an alien under... [8 U.S.C.A. § 1326], the court shall
not have jurisdiction to hear any claim attacking the validity of an [expe-
dited removal order]."41
This bar on collateral attack acquires additional import when
coupled with the provisions precluding judicial review of an expedited
removal order.42 Taken together, these new provisions guarantee that
no court will ever have an opportunity to scrutinize the validity of an
expedited removal order. Thus, under the IIRIRA's new procedures,
an individual immigration officer's evaluation of inadmissibility con-
clusively establishes a material element of a criminal offense.43
Keeping the vocabulary of immigration law and the mechanics of
the new procedures in mind, the discussion now shifts to the jurispru-
dential history of aliens' due process rights in the United States.
38 INA § 276(a), 8 U.S.C-. § 1326(a) (stating that § 1326 violators "shall be fined
under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both"). These penalties make the
violation of § 1326 a felony. The effective period of an expedited removal order is five
years. See INA § 212(a) (9) (A) (i), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a) (9) (A) (i) (stating that "[a]ny alien
who has been ordered [expeditiously removed] ... and who again seeks admission within
5 years of the date of such removal... is inadmissible").
39 See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 276, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163,
229 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (1994)); 3 GORDON ET Ar-, supra note 19,
§ 85.07[2] [d], at 85-79 ("[T]he 1952 Act imposed the criminal penalty on one who reen-
tered improperly after exclusion or deportation.").
40 INA § 235(b) (1) (D), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(b) (1) (D).
41 Id. (emphasis added).
42 For a discussion of the bar on judicial review, see supra note 36 and accompanying
text.
43 The only other material element of the § 1326 offense is that the alien has entered
or attempted to enter the United States during the effective period of the removal order.
INA § 276(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).
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III
THE PLENARY POWER DocTRiNE AND THE SuPREME COURT'S
TRADrrioNAL APPROACH TO PROCEDURAL DuE
PROCESS
For over a century, the Supreme Court has recognized Congress's
nearly unfettered power in the realm of immigration regulation.44
The Court has described this power as "plenary,"45 and commenta-
tors have labeled the Court's recognition of this power the "plenary
power doctrine."46 The doctrine is more than merely judicial rheto-
ric. It encompasses a "doctrine of special judicial deference to Con-
gress" in the area of immigration regulation.4 7
The Court has invoked the plenary power doctrine to defeat con-
stitutional challenges that aliens have brought against immigration
laws.48 The Supreme Court's statement in United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy provides perhaps the most dramatic expression of con-
gressional power and judicial deference: ")Vhatever the procedure
authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied
entry is concerned. '49 Despite this sweeping rhetoric, the degree of
judicial deference given to Congress has varied depending on the con-
text:50 the Court has recognized procedural due process rights for all
44 See, e.g., United States ex rel Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542, 544 (1950)
("The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty.... Whatever the procedure
authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.");
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) (stating that for unnaturalized
and nonresident foreigners seeking entry into the United States, "the decisions of execu-
tive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are
due process of law").
45 See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769 (1972).
46 See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 13, at 256; Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of
Plenary Power. Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASNGs CONST. L.Q. 925, 927
(1995); Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for
Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1626 (1992); Weisselberg, supra
note 11, at 939.
The plenary power doctrine also applies to executive power in immigration regula-
tion. See, e.g., Knauff 338 U.S. at 543 (stating that "the power of exclusion of aliens is also
inherent in the executive department of the sovereign"). However, because this Note con-
cers the action of Congress in writing the IRlRA, the plenary power doctrine need only
be analyzed here as an expression of deference to congressional power.
47 Legomsky, supra note 46, at 926; see also Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 939 (describ-
ing the plenary power doctrine as "a collection of several separate but related principles,"
one of which is "that the judicial branch has an extremely limited role in reviewing...
immigration decisions if, indeed, the judiciary may review those decisions at all").
48 See, e.g., Knauff, 338 U.S. at 543. For this Note's definition of the phrase "immigra-
tion law," see supra note 13.
49 338 U.S. at 544.
50 See MANr, supra note 14, at 9-10; Legomsky, supra note 46, at 926.
[Vol. 83:820
IMMIGRATION REFORM
aliens in deportation proceedings, 51 but only for permanent resident
aliens in exclusion proceedings. 52
The Supreme Court planted the seeds of the contemporary ple-
nary power doctrine over a century ago in The Chinese Exclusion Case
("Ping").53 In that case, a Chinese laborer left the United States after
obtaining a certificate that ostensibly guaranteed his right to return to
the United States. 54 During the laborer's year abroad, Congress
changed the immigration laws to prohibit the return of all Chinese
laborers, even those with certificates. 55 The Court upheld the statute,
stating that Congress's determination as to the necessity, and hence
the validity of the law, was "conclusive upon the judiciary."56
Although the Ping Court upheld the statute using the plenary power
rationale, the Court "did not expressly respond to [the alien's] asser-
tions of individual constitutional rights."57 Thus, the Court left unan-
swered the question of whether plenary power would supplant
individual claims of constitutional rights.
The Court addressed that issue in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,58
holding that individual rights yield to plenary power.59 Ekiu had been
denied entry under a statute that gave immigration officers the au-
thority to exclude "persons likely to become a public charge."60 Ekiu
sought judicial review of the administrative finding of excludability.61
In rejecting Ekiu's challenge, the Court held that Congress's power to
regulate immigration supplanted any procedural due process rights of
first-time arriving aliens in exclusion proceedings. 62 Thus, by the turn
51 See, e.g., The Japanese Immigrant Case (Yamataya v. Fisher), 189 U.S. 86, 101
(1903) (stating that an alien, before he is taken into custody and deported, is entitled to an
opportunity to be heard). For an excellent discussion of the procedural due process ex-
ception to the plenary power doctrine, see Motomura, supra note 46, at 1632-56.
52 See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 22, 32-33 (1982) (holding that a returning
resident alien is protected by the Due Process Clause in exclusion proceedings).
53 Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
54 Id. at 582.
55 See id.
56 Id. at 606. The Court further opined that
Whether a proper consideration by our government of its previous laws, or
a proper respect for the nation whose subjects are affected by its action,
ought to have qualified its inhibition and made it applicable only to per-
sons departing from the country after the passage of the act, are not ques-
tions for judicial determination.
Id. at 609.
57 Motomura, supra note 46, at 1634.
58 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
59 Id. at 660.
60 Id. at 653 n.1 (quoting Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084).
61 See id. at 653-56.
62 Id. at 660 (stating that for immigrants seeking lawful admittance to the United
States for the first time, "the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting within
powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law").
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of the century, the Court had established that aliens in exclusion pro-
ceedings have no due process rights.
In The Japanese Immigrant Case ("Yamatayd'),6s the Court ad-
dressed the issue of the procedural due process rights of aliens in a
different context. Unlike the aliens in Ping and Ekiu, Yamataya had
already entered the United States and was thus subject to deportation
rather than exclusion.64 The Court held that different principles ap-
ply to aliens who have entered the country:
[I] t is not competent for... any executive officer... arbitrarily to
cause an alien, who has entered the country... although alleged to
be illegally here, to be taken into custody and deported without giv-
ing him all opportunity to be heard upon the questions involving
his right to be and remain in the United States. 65
Yamataya carved out an important exception to the plenary power
doctrine: aliens who had entered the country, and were thus subject
to deportation, had procedural due process rights.66 Following Ya-
mataya, the Court adhered to the basic principles set out in the early
cases6 7-while excludable aliens had no procedural due process
rights, deportable aliens did.68
The Cold War brought with it two cases, United States ex rel. Knauff
v. Shaughessy69 and Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 70 whose pro-
government rhetoric marked the high point of the plenary power doc-
trine,7 ' and whose holdings appeared to cement the exclusion-depor-
tation distinction regarding procedural due process.72 In Knauff the
alien wife of a U.S. serviceman sought entry to the United States
63 Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
64 See id. at 87. Yamataya had been in the United States for only four days. See id.
65 a at 101.
66 See Motomura, supra note 46, at 1638 ("Yamataya thus established that when aliens
are in the United States, the Court would hear constitutional challenges based on proce-
dural due process.").
67 See Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 948.
68 See id. at 948-49 & nn.65-66. The language of a few decisions during the first half of
the twentieth century "hinted at increased judicial scrutiny" in exclusion proceedings for
"persons claiming United States citizenship." Motomura, supra note 46, at 1639. However,
"[iln several early citizenship cases," the Court refused "to overturn exclusion orders on
procedural due process grounds." Id. at 1639-40. Though one case "upheld a procedural
due process challenge [in an exclusion situation] .... it is difficult to read the case as a
ringing endorsement of nonwhite aliens' right to be heard." Id. at 1640-41 (footnotes
omitted).
69 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
70 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
71 See Motomura, supra note 46, at 1642 (stating that in the 1950s, "even the rhetoric
turned colder").
72 See MARTIN, supra note 14, at 22 ("The Knauff-Mezei doctrine has generally been
applied to require fairly full procedural due process review under the Constitution in de-
portation cases but to deny it altogether in exclusion cases.").
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under the War Brides Act.73 Based on undisclosed information, the
government ordered her excluded without a hearing.74 In ruling
against the alien, the Court declared that Congress had the power to
define due process for the alien seeking entry.75
In Mezei, the Court upheld procedures identical to those used in
Knauff-exclusion without a hearing, based upon undisclosed infor-
mation.76 However, additional circumstances in Mezei made the de-
nial of procedural due process rights in that case even harsher. First,
the alien had lived in the United States as a permanent resident alien
for twenty-five years before leaving the country for nineteen months.77
In addressing the alien's previous ties to the United States, the major-
ity stated, "the legal incidents of an alien's entry remain unaltered
whether he has been here once before or not. He is an entering alien
just the same ... ."78 Second, the holding of exclusion had extra force
because it led to the alien's indefinite detention on Ellis Island, for he
was similarly denied entry in other countries.7 9 The majority re-
mained unimpressed, stating that "an alien in respondent's position is
no more ours than theirs."8 0 Knauff and Mezei thus appeared to rein-
force the due process rights line between deportation and exclusion.
The deportation-exclusion distinction blurred, however, with the
Supreme Court's Landon v. Plasencia opinion in 1982.81 In that case,
Maria Plasencia, a permanent resident alien, sought to return to the
United States after a two day trip to Mexico.8 2 The government re-
fused, via exclusion proceedings, to re-admit Plasencia.8 3 Plasencia
73 338 U.S. at 539-40.
74 See id. at 539-40. Under a statutorily authorized presidential proclamation, the Sec-
retary of State and the Attorney General had "issued regulations governing the entry into
and departure of persons from the United States during the national emergency." Id. at
540-41. These regulations gave the Attorney General the authority to deny an alien a hear-
ing "in special cases where he determined that the alien was excludable under the regula-
tions on the basis of information of a confidential nature, the disclosure of which would be
prejudicial to the public interest." Id. at 541.
75 Id. at 544.
76 345 U.S. at 208-12 & n.7, 214-15.
77 See id- at 208.
78 Id. at 213.
79 See id. at 207. Fortunately, Ignatz Mezei, the stranded- alien, did not remain
stranded: the Attorney General eventually paroled Mezei into the United States. See Weis-
selberg, supra note 11, at 983-84 & n.266.
80 Mezei, 345 U.S. at 216.
81 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
82 See id. at 23.
83 See id. at 23-25. Plasencia and her husband had attempted to facilitate the illegal
entry of Mexican and Salvadorian nationals. See id. at 23. The relevant statute provided for
"the exclusion of any alien seeking admission 'who at any time shall have, knowingly and
for gain .... assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or to try to enter the United
States in violation of law.'" Id. (quoting Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
§ 212(a) (31) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (6) (E) (i) (1994))).
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filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,8 4 contending alternatively
that she was entitled to a deportation proceeding,8 5 and "that she was
denied due process in her exclusion hearing."8 6 The Court held that
Plasencia was not entitled to a deportation proceeding.8 7 However, in
an opinion that some argue revolutionized contemporary immigra-
tion law,88 the Supreme Court held that Plasencia, as a returning per-
manent resident alien, was entitled to procedural due process
protection in her exclusion proceedings.8 9 The Court reasoned that
"once an alien gains admission to our courftry and begins to develop
the ties that go with permanent residence, his constitutional status
changes accordingly."90
Plasencids ultimate impact on immigration law remains to be
seen. The case ostensibly did not overrule Mezei,91 which held that a
permanent resident alien is not entitled to due process in exclusion
proceedings;92 in fact, the Plasencia Court expressly acknowledged and
distinguished Mezei on the basis of the alien's length of absence from
the United States.93 Nevertheless, some commentators have sug-
gested that Plasencia marks a new era in immigration law: "Plasencia
was an important milestone because it opened the door for others,
with less connection to the United States than returning permanent
residents, to raise procedural due process claims. ' 94 Despite this aca-
demic wishful thinking, as of yet, no court has extended procedural
due process protections in exclusion proceedings to aliens outside the
permanent resident class.95
84 See id. at 22.
85 See id. at 28.
86 Id. at 32.
87 Id. at 30-32.
88 See, e.g., Motomura, supra note 46, at 1652 ("The Supreme Court's 1982 decision in
Landon v. Plasenvia marked the arrival of the due process revolution in immigration law.")
(footnote omitted).
89 Pasencia, 459 U.S. at 32. The Court remanded to determine exactly what process
was due under the test enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 34, 37.
90 Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 32.
91 See MARTIN, supra note 14, at 24.
92 See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
93 459 U.S. at 33-34; see MARTIN, supra note 14, at 24. But see Weisselberg, supra note
11, at 989 ("Plasencia directly conflicts with Mezei and Knauff.").
94 Motomura, supra note 46, at 1655; see also id. (noting that "Plasenda thus intro-
duced a new analytical framework, allowing aliens to raise procedural due process claims
that would have been futile before"); cf. Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 988 ("Landon v.
Plasencia further blurred the line between exclusion and deportation proceedings.") (foot-
note omitted).
95 See supra note 68 for discussion of due process and citizenship claims in exclusion
proceedings.
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IV
ANALYSIS OF THE EXPEDITED REMOVAL PROCEDURE UNDER
THE SuPREMiE COURT'S TRADIoNAL APPROACH
The century of Supreme Court jurisprudence described in Part
III established a straightforward, territorial ffamework for analyzing
aliens' procedural due process claims.96 Rather than engaging in a
nuanced inquiry into the interests involved, the traditional approach
categorizes some aliens as persons and others as nonpersons, depending
on their territorial position.97 Under the pre-llRIRA legal regime,
aliens who entered the country were subject to deportation proceed-
ings that had to comport with due process requirements, while aliens
who had not entered the United States were subject to exclusion pro-
ceedings and had no due process rights.98 Plasencia introduced the
only wrinkle into this traditional territorial approach by holding that,
at least in certain circumstances, returning permanent residents were
entitled to due process in exclusion proceedings.99
This Part analyzes the expedited removal procedure under the
traditional due process approach. The analysis divides the entire
group of aliens subject to expedited removal into three subgroups: (1)
initially arriving aliens; (2) returning aliens; and (3) present aliens.
A. As Applied to Initially Arriving Aliens100
A traditional, territorial due process analysis of the expedited re-
moval procedure as applied to initially arriving aliens is straightfor-
ward. Under pre-IIRIRA immigration law, initially arriving aliens were
subject to exclusion proceedings, and thus enjoyed no procedural due
process rights in those proceedings. 1 1 In recognizing due process
rights for arriving permanent resident aliens, Landon v. Plasencia ex-
pressly reaffirmed this historical constitutional fact: "This Court has
long held that an alien seeking initial admission to the United States
requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his ap-
plication, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign
prerogative."' 0 2
96 Some commentators use the term "territorial" to describe the Supreme Court's
approach to aliens' due process claims. See, e.g., Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 939 (discuss-
ing "the [p]rinciple of [t]erritorial [s]tanding").
97 The alien's territorial position turns on the technical definition of the term "entry"
in pre-IRIRA immigration law. For a discussion of the role of the term "entry" in pre-
IIRIRA immigration law, see infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
98 See supra text accompanying notes 14-18, 50-80.
99 See supra text accompanying notes 81-90.
100 For a discussion of which aliens constitute "initially arriving aliens" for purposes of
this Note, see supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
101 See, e.g., supra note 72.
102 Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (citing United States ex rel Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537,542 (1950); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659-
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Additional language in Plasencia further suggests that the Court
did not intend for its holding to apply to initially arriving aliens. In
contrasting arriving aliens with permanent resident aliens, the
Plasencia Court stated, "once an alien gains admission to our country
and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence, his
constitutional status changes accordingly."' 03 This language suggests
that an alien must both gain admission to the country, and begin to
develop ties to the country in order to acquire constitutional protec-
tion.10 4 Arriving aliens clearly fall short of the first requirement-they
stand at the border waiting to be admitted. They also fail to satisfy the
requirement of "ties" to the country, as set forth by the Plasencia
Court.10 5 Although arriving aliens could come to the United States
already having ties to the country,10 6 the language of Plasencia suggests
that admittance is a prerequisite to the development of ties.10 7 Fur-
thermore, the Plasencia Court characterized those ties as "the ties that
go with permanent residence."'108 Because initially arriving aliens are
not permanent residents, they have no such ties. Thus, Plasencia does
not alter the traditional analysis's conclusion that initially arriving
aliens have no procedural due process protection.
Without procedural due process protection, initially arriving
aliens cannot mount a due process attack against the expedited re-
moval procedure. Thus, as applied to those aliens, traditional analysis
concludes that the IIRIRA's expedited removal procedure is
constitutional.
B. As Applied to Returning Aliens' 0 9
Examination of the expedited removal procedure as applied to
returning aliens under the traditional framework is also straightfor-
ward. Before the enactment of the IIRIRA, returning aliens, like their
initially arriving counterparts, were subject to exclusion proceedings
and enjoyed no due process rights in those proceedings. 110 Although
60 (1892)). The Court went on to say, "Our recent decisions confirm that view." Id. (cit-
ing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972)).
103 459 U.S. at 32.
104 See id.
105 See supra text accompanying note 103.
106 See infra Part V.C.1.
107 459 U.S. at 32 (stating that "once an alien gains admission to our country and
begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence, his constitutional status
changes accordingly"). This interpretation of Plasencia is contrary to that offered in
THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND PoLIcY 629-34 (3d ed.
1995).
108 459 U.S. at 32.
109 For a discussion of which aliens constitute "returning aliens" for purposes of this
Note, see supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
I10 See, e.g., supra note 72.
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returning aliens come closer to falling within the purview of the hold-
ing in Plasencia because they have been previously admitted,"' they
fail to satisfy Plasencia's seemingly critical requirement of permanent
residence. 112
Hence, returning aliens, like their initially arriving counterparts,
have no due process claim with which to attack the expedited removal
procedure. Thus, the traditional'analysis holds that the expedited re-
moval procedure is constitutional as applied to returning aliens.
C. As Applied to Present Aliens"13
A traditional, territorial due process analysis of the expedited re-
moval of present aliens is more complicated. At first blush, the
Court's longstanding recognition of procedural due process rights for
present aliens 114 appears to establish that present aliens are entitled,
at a minimum, to some due process before being expelled from the
country." 5 The traditional analysis becomes cloudier, however, when
one recognizes that provisions of the ITRIRA may have altered the
constitutional status of present aliens under a traditional analysis.
The obvious question, then, is how a statutory change could possibly
have affected constitutional status.
The answer lies in the strange significance that pre-IIRIRA law
accorded the concept of "entry," and the IIRIRA's amendment of that
concept. In the pre-IIRIRA regime, the technical, legal concept of
entry established the constitutional line between deportable and ex-
cludable aliens." 6 Aliens who entered the country under the defini-
tion of entry" 7 enjoyed procedural due process rights in deportation
proceedings, while aliens who had not entered the country had no
Ill See supra text accompanying notes 103-04, 107.
112 See supra text accompanying notes 103, 108.
113 For a discussion of which aliens constitute "present aliens" for purposes of this
Note, see supra notes 23, 25-26 and accompanying text.
114 Under pre-IGURA law, present aliens were deportable, and thus entitled to due
process protection. See, e.g., supra note 72.
115 Under the Court's contemporary two-tiered due process framework, aliens who
demonstrate that the Due Process Clause protects them must then establish that they are
entitled to additional process under Mathews v. Eldridg, 424 U.S. 319, 332-35 (1976). See
infra text accompanying notes 133-36.
116 See ALEINiKOFF ET At., supra note 107, at 474-76. Describing the pre-IIRIRA land-
scape, Aleinikoff and his coauthors observed that "[t]he concept of 'entry' into the United
States play[ed] a crucial, and somewhat curious, role in immigration law. For an alien
whom the government [sought] to send home, 'entry' [was] the difference between exclu-
sion and deportation...." Id. As discussed supra Part I, the deportation/exclusion dis-
tinction gained constitutional significance. SeeALoNiKoFF ET AL., supra note 107, at 475-76
(stating, in a discussion of the relevance of the term "entry," that "aliens in deportation
hearings [found] it easier to raise constitutional claims, particularly procedural due pro-
cess claims, than aliens in exclusion hearings.").
117 For one articulation of the definition of entry, see Matter of G, 20 I & N Dec. 764
(BIA 1993):
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due process protection in their exclusion proceedings.1 18 Present
aliens fell into the deportable category because they had entered the
country.
By replacing the concept of entry with the concept of "admis-
sion," 1 9 the new law has redrawn the line that once separated exclud-
able from deportable aliens.' 20 Under this new classification scheme,
present aliens find themselves grouped with formerly "excludable" ar-
riving aliens within the general category of "inadmissibles."12
Given this change, a court performing a traditional analysis
would face a difficult choice. First, a court could accept the concept
of admission as the new due process dividing line. Given pre-IIRIRA
courts' willingness to use the hypertechnical notion of entry to reach
both harsh 12 2 and inconsistent conclusions, 12 3 a strict traditional terri-
torial approach could very well accept admission as the new due pro-
cess line. Indeed, such an approach would have the benefit of
removing the inconsistency in the prior approach. 12 4 Under this anal-
ysis, present aliens would have no procedural due process weapon
with which to attack the expedited removal procedure.
In relevant part, an "entry" for immigration purposes is defined as "any
coming of an alien into the United States, from a foreign port or place or
from an outlying possession, whether voluntary or otherwise." Section
101 (a) (13) of the [Immigration and Nationality] Act. Over time, caselaw
has led to the formulation of a more precise definition of that term, requir-
ing: (1) a crossing into the territorial limits of the United States, i.e., physi-
cal presence; (2) (a) inspection and admission by an immigration officer, or
(b) actual and intentional evasion of inspection at the nearest inspection
point; and (3) freedom from official restraint.
Id. at 768.
118 See supra Part III. As noted above, Plasencia broke down this distinction for at least
some returning permanent resident aliens. See supra notes 81-95 and accompanying text.
119 Stanley Mailman, "Admission" and "Unlawful Presence" in the New LO"RAiA Lexicon, in
2 AmxmcAN IMMIGRATION LAWYERS Ass'N, 1997-98 IMMIGRATION & NATrONA=rY LAw H A)-
BOOK 1 (R. Patrick Murphy ed., 1997) ("Conceptually, one of the [IIRIRA's] most funda-
mental changes is the downgrading of 'entry' to the United States as a basic immigration
concept, and the elevation of 'admission' in its place ... ."). For the new definition of
"admission," see INA § 101 (a) (13) (A), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a) (13) (A) (West Supp. 1997)
("The terms 'admission' and 'admitted' mean, with respect to an alien, the lawful entry of
the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration
officer.").
120 See 2 GORDON ET AL., supra note 19, § 63.01 [3].
121 Mailman, supra note 119, at 7 ("Now, not only those seeking admission, but anyone
who arrives in the United States, or is present here and not admitted, is deemed an appli-
cant for admission. In general, therefore, those who have entered without inspection...
remain subject to the admissions process .... .") (footnote omitted).
122 For an example of harsh results, see the discussion of Ignatz Mezei's case, supra
notes 76-80 and accompanying text; see also infra note 130 (providing examples of critical
commentary on the harshness of plenary power doctrine).
123 For a discussion of the inconsistent outcomes, which resulted in large part from the
definition of "entry" and its role as the trigger for due process protection, see infra note
130 and accompanying text.
124 See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
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Alternatively, a court could adhere to the prior concept of entry
as the due process dividing line, and thus hold that present aliens
continue to have due process lights. A court that did not want to
increase the already-existing tension between immigration law and
contemporary constitutional law125 by further restricting aliens' due
process rights might opt for this approach. Under this approach, the
court would use the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test to determine
whether additional process was due.126
Unfortunately, neither option is attractive. Under the first ap-
proach, congressional action takes away the previously recognized per-
sonhood of present aliens as far as the Due Process Clause is
concerned.127 The second approach is arguably more palatable be-
cause it retains due process protection for a heretofore protected
group. The second approach loses some of its luster, however, when
one considers its method of analysis: personhood, for due process
purposes, continues to turn on a hypertechnical definition of entry, a
concept that is no longer directly rooted in codified immigration
law.128 Thus, the traditional approach leaves a court with two unat-
tractive alternatives. As the next Part argues, however, a court should
not, and most likely will not, have to choose between these two unat-
tractive options.
In sum, this Part examined the expedited removal procedure
under the traditional, territorial mode of due process analysis. For
aliens subject to expedited removal, the results are troublesome. The
procedure is clearly constitutional as applied to initially arriving and
returning aliens, and presents a close constitutional question as ap-
plied to present aliens. 129 More disturbing than the results, however,
is the traditional framework's method of analysis: initially arriving and
returning aliens are treated as nonpersons for due process purposes,
and the personhood of present aliens is unclear.
125 For a discussion of this tension, see infra Part V.A.
126 For a general discussion of Mathews v. Eldridge balancing, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 134-36. For a detailed analysis of the Eldridge balancing for present aliens subject
to expedited removal, see infra Part V.C.3.
127 Commentators have argued that immigration law's plenary power doctrine allows
Congress to make classifications that affect constitutional status. See, e.g., Weisselberg,
supra note 11, at 953-54.
128 Although the concept of admission has replaced the prominent place that the con-
cept of entry once filled, the concept of entry continues to appear in some parts of the
INA. See Mailman, supra note 119, at 10 (noting that "[a]lIthough drained of some of its
vitality, the concept of entry... had been selectively retained as a key term" in various
places in the INA).
129 These results are troublesome because expedited removal provides virtually no pro-
cess beyond the determination of a single immigration inspector. See supra Part IIA.
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V
AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY OF DuiE PRocEss ANALYSIS
After revisiting plenary power and discussing the chasm that sepa-
rates immigration law's due process approach from the rest of consti-
tutional due process law, this Part argues that the IIRIRA presents an
opportunity to repair that division. More specifically, the Supreme
Court should look upon the IIRIRA as an opportunity to bring immi-
gration law into step with the larger body of contemporary constitu-
tional law by adopting a new due process approach. This Part
concludes that the new approach has distinct process values, apart
from its results, that favor its adoption.
A. Problems with Plenary Power and an Invitation for Change
Commentators have attacked the wisdom of the plenary power
doctrine on virtually every front. From a practical standpoint, critics
point out the harsh and inconsistent results that the doctrine pro-
duces. 130 From a doctrinal perspective, critics deconstruct the justifi-
cations proffered in favor of plenary power.13' From a comparative
point of view, commentators observe that the plenary power doctrine
has created a chasm between immigration law and the larger body of
constitutional due process law.'3 2
130 For an example of the harsh results, see the treatment of Ignatz Mezei, discussed
supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text. For critical comment on the harshness of the
doctrine, see, for example, T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the Con-
stitution, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 862, 865 (1989) (characterizing the plenary power cases as
"harsh"); Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 1034 ("[O]ur treatment of aliens ultimately be-
comes a tale about us and not about them. It is discomforting to be part of a nation that
permits indefinite detention and unreviewable decision-making ... ").
Aleinikoff and his coauthors clearly express the inconsistency of the territorial
approach:
You should now be quite familiar with the curious results occasioned
by a constitutional test that largely turns on the location of the alien. For
example, an alien who arrives at the border with an immigrant visa and a
job or family awaiting him in the United States is essentially unprotected by
the Constitution's Due Process Clause. However, an alien who is appre-
hended a few hours after making a surreptitious entry is afforded, as a mat-
ter of constitutional right, a hearing, an opportunity to present evidence
and cross-examine witnesses, an unbiased decision-maker and, sometimes,
counsel.
ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 107, at 629-30.
131 See Legomsky, supra note 13, at 260-78, 304 (discussing policy-based justifications
for the plenary power doctrine, and concluding that "the doctrinal theories advanced from
time to time in support of plenary Congressional power over immigration are becoming
increasingly difficult to defend"); Legomsky, supra note 46, at 937 (noting that "the plenary
power doctrine... has never been adequately explained on grounds of either policy or
precedent").
132 See, e.g., ALE NmKoFF E AL., supra note 107, at 638 (stating that "[t]he border/inte-
rior distinction... is out of step with modem notions of due process"); Aleinikoff, supra
note 130, at 865 ("Immigration law has remained blissfully untouched by the virtual revolu-
tion in constitutional law since World War II, impervious to developments in due process,
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To see this chasm, one need only compare the Supreme Court's
modem due process framework to immigration law's approach.
Under the Court's modern due process framework, government ac-
tion must deprive an individual of a life, liberty, or property interest in
order to trigger the protection of the Due Process Clause. 33 After the
aggrieved establishes such a deprivation, a court moves to Mathews v.
Eldridg'3 4 balancing to determine what, if any, additional process is
due. Eldridge identifies three factors for consideration:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of ad-
ditional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Gov-
ernment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute proce-
dural requirement would entail.' 3 5
The individual's interest at stake and the procedural factor are
weighed together against the government's interest in maintaining
the current procedures in order to determine whether due process
requires additional procedures. 136
As demonstrated above in Parts III and IV, immigratioi law's
traditional due process approach bears no resemblance to the Court's
modern due process framework. Rather than engaging in a nuanced
balancing of life, liberty, or property interests, immigration law's tradi-
tional approach simply treats certain aliens as nonpersons to whom
the Due Process Clause does not apply. This dissimilarity in ap-
equal protection and criminal procedure."); Legomsky, supra note 46, at 937 ("Immigra-
tion commentators are well aware that our field has long been a constitutional oddity. For
the most part, the Supreme Court has not applied to immigration cases the constitutional
norms familiar in other areas of public law."); Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immi-
gration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 1 (1984) ("In a legal firmament transformed by revolu-
tions in due process and equal protection doctrine and by a new conception of judicial
role, immigration law remains the realm in which government authority is at the zenith,
and individual entitlement is at the nadir.").
133 See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972) (stating that "the
range of interests protected by procedural due process is not infinite .... [T]o determine
whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look.., to the nature of
the interest at stake."); GERALD GuNTErr, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 584 (12th ed., 1991) ("In-
stead of readily assuming that a constitutionally protected interest is involved and dwelling
primarily on the question of the appropriate contours of procedural due process in that
context, the Court has increasingly paused at the outset to ask whether a constitutionally
protected interest is presented.").
134 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
'35 Id. at 335.
136 See id
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proaches, and the other problems with the plenary power doctrine, 37
indicate that the doctrine is in dire need of change.13 8
The IIRIRA provides the Supreme Court with the opportunity to
make that change. Instead of trying to force the JIRIRA's new classifi-
cations into the existing, much maligned territorial framework, the
Court should look upon the new law as an opportunity to abandon
the territorial framework and implement the stake theory as a means
of adjudicating aliens' due process claims.
B. The Stake Theory
Under the stake theory, courts would determine an alien's proce-
dural due process rights by looking to "the relationship of the alien to
the community of which he is a part or which he seeks to join."139
Although stake theorists articulate various definitions of "stake,"t4°
they generally agree that an alien's due process rights should turn on
that alien's relationship to the United States.141 Given that different
alien groups have different degrees of relationship to the United
States, stake theorists envision a sliding scale of due process protection
depending on the alien's ties to the country.142 In order to determine
137 See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
138 Indeed, some commentators have even gone so far as to argue that Plasencia
marked the death of plenary power and its territorial due process approach. Hiroshi
Motomura argues that
Plasenciawas an important milestone because it opened the door for others,
with less connection to the United States than returning permanent resi-
dents, to raise procedural due process claims .... [T]he basic concepts
underlying Plasencia were simply too difficult to cabin. The statutory exclu-
sion-deportation line was not constitutionally determinative, but rather
aliens enjoyed degrees of "entitlement-and in turn degrees of access to
procedural due process rights-depending on the nature and extent of
their attachment to the United States. Plasencia thus introduced a new ana-
lytical framework, allowing aliens to raise procedural due process claims
that would have been futile before Goldberg v. Kelly.
Motomura, supra note 46, at 1655; see also ALErNKoFF ET AL., supra note 107, at 635 (stating
that "there is much in the [Plasencia] opinion that not only undermines Knauff, but also
signals adoption of a 'stake' theory").
139 ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 107, at 638. For a full discussion of the stake theory,
see id. at 631-39.
140 Compare Martin, supra note 11, at 191-204 (arguing that level of membership in the
national community should dictate what process is due) with T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Aliens, Due Process and "Community Ties": A Response to Martin, 44 U. Prrr. L. REv. 237, 244-
45 (1983) ("[W]hereas Professor Martin would examine the notion of community, I would
look at community ties... The notion of 'community ties'.. . indicates the actual relation-
ships the individual has developed with a society: a family, friends, ajob, association mem-
berships, professional acquaintances, opportunities. 'Community' is a more amorphous
concept").
141 See ALrNMoFFT AL, supra note 107, at 638.
142 See id. at 634-38.
[Vol. 83:820
IMMIGRATION REFORM
what process is due in a particular case under the stake theory, courts
would engage in Eldridge balancing. 143
The Supreme Court's approach in Landon v. Plasencia indicates
that the Court could be amenable to a stake theory.'4 Plasencia estab-
lished that the deportation/exclusion line does not determine consti-
tutional status for permanent resident aliens. 145 Granted, the
Plasencia Court attempted to limit its holding to the permanent resi-
dent class.146 However, the shift in analytical approach-from territo-
rial distinctions to an examination of aliens' ties to the country-
indicates that aliens' due process claims should turn on stake.147
Critics of the stake theory are likely to argue, as a preliminary
matter, that the theory, as proposed, does not fit within the Supreme
Court's contemporary two-step due process framework. 148 Consider-
ing that the scope of the concept of liberty appears to have shrunk in
recent years,149 stake theory critics could assert that an alien's stake
simply does not satisfy the rigid first requirement of contemporary
due process analysis-establishing that the government has deprived
the claimant of a life, liberty, or property interest. A number of re-
sponses to this argument indicate, however, that the formalistic lib-
erty/property inquiry should not and will not prevent the Supreme
Court from adopting the stake theory.
First, the Supreme Court's decision in Plasencia, and the subse-
quent application of Plasencia by the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals in Rafeedie v. Immigration & Naturalization Service,150
indicate that the Court may not require a tight fit between the alien's
stake and a liberty or property interest. In holding that a returning
resident alien was entitled to due process in her exclusion proceed-
ings, the Plasencia Court did not identify a particular liberty or prop-
erty interest that triggered the Eldridge inquiry.151 Rather, the Court
stated generally that "once an alien gains admission to our country
143 See id. at 636. For an explanation of Eldridge balancing, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 134-36.
144 See ALEINIKOFF Er AL., supra note 107, at 635 (arguing that "[a]t a more fundamen-
tal level ... there is much in the [Plasencia] opinion that not only undermines Knauff, but
also signals adoption of a 'stake' theory").
145 Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982).
146 Id. (stating that (1) "an alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests
a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application"; and (2) "once an
alien gains admission to our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent
residence, his constitutional status changes accordingly") (emphasis added).
147 See supra note 138.
148 For a description of the contemporary two-step due process framework, see supra
text accompanying notes 133-36.
149 See, e.g., GUNTHER, supra note 133, at 594. Commentators have criticized the
Court's restrictive view of "liberty" interests. See, e.g., id at 596 n.4, 597.
150 880 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
151 459 U.S. at 32.
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and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence, his
constitutional status changes accordingly."152 Thus, the Court was
willing to engage in Eldridge balancing without first casting the alien's
stake as a liberty or property interest.
Despite the Supreme Court's failure to identify a liberty or prop-
erty interest in Plasencia, a 1992 D.C. Circuit opinion characterized the
due process trigger in Plasencia as a liberty interest. 53 Elaborating on
the alien's interest, however, the D.C. Circuit spoke more in terms of
stake than liberty:
A permanent resident may have not only significant personal ties to
the United States... he may also have, and have discharged, sub-
stantial legal obligations to this country [i.e., armed forces service].
These ties give the permanent resident alien a stake in the Unites
States substantial enough to command the protection of due pro-
cess before he may be excluded or deported; the result, after all,
may be to separate him from family, friends, property, and career,
and to remit him to starting a new life in a new land.' 5"
Furthermore, one must remember that Rafeedie superimposed the la-
bel of "liberty interest" after the Supreme Court deemed such labeling
unnecessary. 55 The Supreme Court's failure to identify a triggering
interest in Plasencia indicates that aliens' procedural due process
claims may not need to be couched in terms of liberty or property
interests.
As a second response to the claim that aliens cannot satisfy the
liberty/property threshold requirement, one can make a strong argu-
ment that aliens who are subject to expedited removal do face the risk
of being deprived of a liberty or property interest in the contempo-
rary, formal sense. 156 The Supreme Court has established that the na-
ture of the threatened interest is the only factor to consider in
152 Id.
153 Rafeedie, 880 F.2d at 520 (stating that "a permanent resident alien ... has a liberty
interest in being permitted to reenter this country and is therefore entitled to due process
before he can be denied admission").
154 Id. at 522 (emphasis added). Although the first sentence of the Rafeedie excerpt
appears to inextricably link permanent residence to the establishment of stake, the second
part of the second sentence, which speaks to the deprivation that would result from exclu-
sion, identifies losses that a number of alien groups could suffer. Thus, Rafeedie can be
read as support for the proposition that the risk of separating an alien from "family,
friends, property, and career" triggers due process protection.
155 See supra text accompanying notes 151-52.
156 T. Alexander Aleinikoff argues that "it seems sensible to conclude that governmen-
tal action that seeks to remove an alien from the territory of the United States implicates a
'liberty' interest of the targeted individual." Aleinikoff, supra note 130, at 867. Hiroshi
Motomura posits that "aliens... could argue that statutes or other expressions of govern-
ment policy gave them expectations of admission that qualified as 'property' or 'liberty'
interests." Motomura, supra note 46, at 1655.
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determining whether the interest implicates the due process clause. 57
In describing the liberty interests at stake for the .permanent resident
alien in exclusion proceedings, the Rafeedie court stated that "the re-
sult [of exclusion], after all, may be to separate him from family,
friends, property, and career, and to remit him to starting a new life in
a new land."' 58 The same type of interests are threatened when the
expedited removal procedure is applied to initially arriving, returning,
and present aliens. 59
Consider the case of John Psaropoulos, a British subject working
in the United States as a television journalist for the past three
years.' 60 Following a two-week vacation to Greece, Psaropoulos sought
to re-enter the United States.' 6 ' Because Psaropoulos's employer had
failed to file a required labor form along with Psaropoulos's applica-
tion to extend his work visa, an immigration inspector ordered Psaro-
poulos expeditiously removed. 62 Following the statutory procedures,
Psaropoulos received no review of the determination of inadmissibil-
ity.163 As New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis observed, "[t]he
blow was more traumatic for Mr. Psaropoulos than it might have been
for others because more than his job was at stake. He was engaged to
be married to an American woman .... 164 Admittedly, permanent
residents, as a class, may have greater liberty interests at stake when
they are subject to removal proceedings. It is difficult, however, to
meaningfully distinguish the nature of the interest described in
Rafeedie from the nature of the interest in Psaropoulos's case.' 65 Using
157 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972) ("[To] determine
whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the 'weight'
but to the nature of the interest at stake. We must look to see if the interest is within the
Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property.") (citation omitted).
158 880 F.2d at 522.
159 See, e.g., infra notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
160 The story is described fully in Anthony Lewis, Is this America?, N.Y. TrMSs, Aug. 18,
1997, at A19.
161 See id.
162 See id. Actually, Psaropoulos "was allowed into the country temporarily, to be given
a 'deferred inspection' later." Id. During the five weeks that passed between his re-entry
and his deferred inspection, the application to extend his visa was denied. See id. At the
deferred inspection on May 7, Psaropoulos met with an Immigration and Naturalization
officer. See id. After Psaropoulos sat down for the meeting with the officer, "'[t]he door
opened and two men entered the room with handcuffs. [The officer] explained that
[Psaropoulos] was to be Expeditiously Removed from the United States and barred from
entering for five years.'" Id. Psaropoulos spent the night in a detention center, and was
flown out of the country the next day. See id. In a rather complicated turn of events,
Psaropoulos eventually was granted permission to reapply for admission, and was allowed
back into the country. See id.
163 See id.
164 Id.
165 In Hamaya v. McElroy, another procedural due process case involving a returning
permanent resident, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
provided the following description of the liberty interest at issue:
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the words of the Rafeedie court, the result in the Psaropoulos case was
"to separate him from [soon-to-be] family, friends, property, and ca-
reer, and to remit him to starting a new life in a new land."'66 In
other words, the nature of the liberty interest was the same in both
cases.
167
Finally, even if the Court clings to a formalistic, two-tiered mode
of due process analysis in immigration cases, and if the Court refuses
to recognize liberty or property interests for all aliens, it could still
adopt a modified stake theory under which some aliens have liberty or
property interests at risk in removal proceedings, and other aliens do
The liberty interest at issue in this case is not merely whether Hamaya is to
remain in INS custody; it is whether Hamaya is to be deprived of the free-
dom to reside, work, and travel within the United States, rights which Hamaya
was formerly granted when he became a resident alien.
Hamaya v. McElroy, 797 F. Supp. 186, 191 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). Although the Hamaya court
linked the rights to permanent residence, the case language provides additional support
for the argument that the nature of the interest can be the same for aliens subject to
expedited removal as it is for permanent resident aliens subject to exclusion proceedings.
Thus, Hamaya provides additional case support for the position that an alien's stake quali-
fies as a liberty interest.
166 880 F.2d at 522.
167 One could attempt to distinguish permanent residents by arguing that the liberty
interest identified in Rafeedie was a liberty interest created by expectations set forth in the
immigration laws. In other words, the statutory grant of permanent resident status creates
for the alien a reasonable expectation that he or she will not be separated from family,
career, property, and friends without appropriate procedures, and other alien groups have
no similar statutorily created expectations. Cf GUNTHER, supra note 133, at 588-94, 597-98
(describing state law as a source of property and liberty interests in modem cases). The
clear response to this argument is that immigration laws create the same sort of expecta-
tions for most aliens subject to expedited removal. Initially arriving immigrants, who are
subject to expedited removal, see infra Part V.C.1, are merely one step removed from offi-
cial permanent residence. SeeALMNIKOFF E- AL., supra note 107, at 424-26. Thus, they have
the same sort of statutorily created expectations as returning permanent residents. Fur-
thermore, the nonimmigrant visa provisions of the immigration laws arguably create the
same type of objective expectations for nonimmigrants. Granted, a nonimmigrant visa
does not guarantee admission. See id. at 422. However, returning permanent residents are
subject to the same grounds of inadmissibility as initially arriving nonimmigrants. See id. at
427 (observing that permanent resident status "will not assure re-entry"); 2 GORDON ET AL.,
supra note 19, § 63.01 [3] (stating that "[g] rounds of inadmissibility now apply to any alien
who has not been admitted into the United States"). Thus, the nature of the statutorily
created expectations appears to be the same.
This statutorily created expectations argument is troublesome, however, when one
considers undocumented aliens, especially those apprehended while trying to cross the
border. The laws clearly create no reasonable expectations for undocumented aliens at-
tempting to enter the United States. Therefore, this group may justifiably have a difficult
time establishing a liberty or property interest at stake in removal proceedings, and the
Supreme Court may thus adopt a "modified stake theory" under which undocumented
aliens seeking entry do not satisfy the liberty or property interest requirement, and there-
fore, do not get to the next step, which is Eldridge balancing. See infra text accompanying
note 168. The statutorily created expectations argument is less of a hurdle for undocu-
mented aliens already inside the U.S. borders, because these individuals, by virtue of their
physical presence, have stronger non-statutorily created ties that arguably warrant due pro-
cess protection. See infra Part V.C.3.
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not. 68 The D.C. Circuit appears to have adopted this approach in
Rafeedie.169 In reconciling the Supreme Court's harsh statement in
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy with mainstream due process
doctrine, the Rafeedie court stated:
Before we address the question whether Rafeedie is entitled by
the Constitution to any procedural safeguards when the Govern-
ment would deprive him of his liberty, we pause to clarify a source
of potential confusion in the relevant cases. The Supreme Court
appeared at one time to suggest that, for aliens initially entering this
country, the congressionally prescribed process is, ipso facto, due
process. As we read Knauff, it does not rest on the proposition that
an initial entrant is entitled to due process of law before he can be
denied entry but that any process provided by statute, no matter
how truncated, constitutes all the process due, by the mere fact that
Congress prescribed no more. If that were the Court's implication,
then the Due Process Clause would apply to, but have no opera-
tional significance for, the class of cases presented by aliens denied
initial entry into the United States. That may have been the
Framer's intent. The Supreme Court long ago determined, how-
ever, that the due process concept has a content independent of
legislative or common law usage, and contemporary due process ju-
risprudence is built upon that foundation. Rather than unsettling the
edifice of due process in this casual manner, therefore, we read the Knauff
Court merely to have been observing that an initial entrant has no liberty (or
other) interest in entering the United States, and thus has no constitutional
right to any process in that context .... 170
Under this approach, some aliens would be entitled to an Eldridge in-
quiry to determine whether they received the process that was due,
while others would never get to Eldridge. Even this more limited ap-
proach would be an improvement over the traditional, territorial ap-
proach because the limited approach would provide some of the
process benefits discussed below in Part V.D.
Having identified the basic tenets of the stake theory, the discus-
sion now turns to performing a stake theory analysis of the expedited
removal procedure. The next Section attempts to make a realistic
forecast of how the Supreme Court would most likely adopt the the-
ory.17 ' Thus, this application may differ from what some stake theo-
rists would argue is the proper application of the theory.
168 Cf ALmINIKOFF ET A.., supra note 107, at 412 (engaging in Socratic dialogue regard-
ing property or liberty interests that are potentially at stake for different classes of aliens
seeking admission to the United States).
169 880 F.2d at 519-20.
170 Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
171 The analysis proceeds under the assumption that all aliens subject to expedited
removal have some liberty or property interest at stake. This assumption reflects the au-
thor's belief that the nature of the deprivation that the expedited removal procedure im-
19981 845
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
C. The Stake Theory in Action: Analysis of the Expedited
Removal Procedure
In order to determine whether the expedited removal procedure
violates the due process rights of aliens subject to the procedure, one
must evaluate the procedure under the Eldridge balancing test.'7 2 This
Section looks to the Supreme Court's Landon v. Plasencia decision for
guidance on Eldridge balancing in the immigration context. Although
Plasencia dealt with permanent resident aliens, a class that is higher in
the hierarchy for receipt of procedural due process than those aliens
subject to expedited removal, 173 the opinion is useful as a point of
reference. The analysis attempts to quantify interests as high, medium,
or low. Recognizing that such quantifications mean little in the ab-
stract, the analysis employs the ratings only as a rough means of com-
paring the various competing interests.
1. As Applied to Initially Arriving Aliens' 74
The Supreme Court's Plasencia opinion is the starting point for
analysis of the expedited removal procedure as applied to initially ar-
riving aliens. That decision provides some guidance in quantifying
two of the Eldridge factors-the individual's interest and the govern-
ment interest.175 For returning permanent resident aliens, Plasencia
stated that the individual interest is "without question, a weighty
one."'71 6 In specifically identifying the individual interest, the Court
pointed to two rights at stake for a returning permanent resident: (1)
"the right 'to stay and live and work in this land of freedom'";177 and
(2) "the right to rejoin her immediate family, a right that ranks high
among the interests of the individual." 178
poses on an alien justifies some procedural due process protection. See supra notes 156-67
and accompanying text for arguments in favor of this position. Of course, the D.C. Circuit
has expressly stated otherwise, at least with respect to initially arriving aliens. Rafeedi4 880
F.2d at 520; see supra text accompanying note 170. Furthermore, note that arriving, un-
documented aliens will (perhaps justifiably) have the most difficulty satisfying the liberty/
property threshold. See supra note 167.
172 The stake theory uses Eldridge balancing to determine what process is due. See supra
text accompanying note 143. For a discussion of Eldfidge balancing, see supra text accom-
panying notes 134-36.
173 SeeALEINIKOFF Er AL., supra note 107, at 635 (recognizing that "lesser constitutional
protections apply for initial entrants than resident aliens").
174 For a discussion of which aliens constitute "initially arriving aliens" for purposes of
this Note, see supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
175 Before remanding for ultimate balancing by the lower court, Justice O'Connor
roughly quantified the individual interest and the government interest. Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982).
176 Id.
177 Id. (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945)).
178 Id.
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In comparing the weight of initially arriving aliens' interests to
the weight of the interests of the returning permanent resident in
Plasencia, one must first determine the type of initial entrant. T. Alex-
ander Aleinikoff draws a distinction between immigrant and nonim-
migrant initial entrants.
[T]hese classes of aliens [immigrants and nonimmigrants] present
distinct issues. To be granted an immigrant visa an alien must nor-
mally demonstrate that he or she has a close family relative in this
country or is coming to perform a neededjob. Generally, someone
in the United States-a relative or employer-must have filed a pe-
tition on the alien's behalf. Aliens arriving with immigrant visas are
entitled to stay as long as they wish (subject to deportation for mis-
conduct). In short, they usually come to this country with a pre-
existing stake awaiting them and with an intention to make the
United States their permanent home. Most aliens entering the
country with non-immigrant visas, on the other hand, come here as
temporary visitors with a fixed time limit on their stays. Many must
demonstrate that they have "no intention of abandoning" their resi-
dence in a foreign country. To be sure, non-immigrants may come
with important business to conduct or studies to pursue; but gener-
ally the harm imposed upon a non-immigrant wrongfully denied en-
try is likely to be far less than an immigrant wrongfully excluded. 179
Thus, initial entrants with immigrant visas have a higher stake than
those with nonimmigrant visas.' 80 At the same time, all initial entrants
are distinguishable in an important way from the returning perma-
nent resident alien in Plasencia: initial entrants have not yet been ad-
mitted to the United States. This lack of prior admittance means that
initial entrants have not had the opportunity to establish the same
degree of ties to the United States that returning permanent residents
are likely to have established. 181 Taking all of these considerations
into account, we can characterize the personal interest of initially ar-
riving, immigrant visa holders as medium, and the personal interest of
179 Aleinikoff, supra note 130, at 246-47 (footnotes omitted).
180 One could further distinguish undocumented initial entrants from both inuni-
grants and nonimmigrants. See id. Because initially arriving noninunigrants have the low-
est possible individual interest on the Eldridge scale, see infra text accompanying note 182,
this Note treats undocumented initial entrants the same as initial entrants with nonimmi-
grant visas. In the future, once plenary power fades from judicial memory, see infra text
accompanying note 219, the distinction between nonimmigrant visaholders and undocu-
mented aliens will likely become more important. See supra note 167.
181 See ALiaior xr AL., supra note 107, at 635 (stating that "lesser constitutional pro-
tections apply for initial entrants than resident aliens"); Aleinikoff, supra note 130, at 245
("An alien seeking entry for the first time is likely to be able to demonstrate far fewer
existing ties to the community.").
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initially arriving, nonimmigrant visa holders (and undocumented
aliens 8 2) as low.
In weighing the government interest, Plasencia provides valuable
insight into the Court's likely approach to Eldridge balancing under a
stake analysis. Describing the government's interest, Justice
O'Connor stated, "The Government's interest in efficient administra-
tion of the immigration laws at the border... is weighty. Further, it
must weigh heavily in the balance that control over matters of immi-
gration is a sovereign prerogative, largely within the control of the
Executive and the Legislature."' 83 This articulation of the govern-
ment's interest is extremely important for a stake analysis because it
signals incorporation of the plenary power doctrine in Eldridge balanc-
ing. If the Supreme Court adopts a stake theory but imports plenary
power into the government side of the balance, aliens will face more
difficulty convincing courts that the Eldridge balance requires addi-
tional process.
Whether the Supreme Court will hold that plenary power should
weigh on the government's side of the Eldridge balance under a stake
theory is a difficult question. Lower courts that have subsequently ap-
plied Plasencia have not weighed plenary power on the government's
side of the balance. 184 Despite the Supreme Court's failure to correct
these omissions, the Court is likely to use Eldridge balancing to import
plenary power into its stake theory in order to reduce the impact of
the doctrinal change by maintaining some level of deference to the
political branches in immigration regulation. 8 5 Assuming that the
Court will import plenary power into the Eldridge balancing, the gov-
ernment interest in maintaining the existing expedited removal pro-
cedure for initial entrants is high. This factor remains constant for all
aliens subject to expedited removal because the plenary power doc-
trine has traditionally applied to all issues of alien admission and
removal.' 8 6
The final Eldridge factor is the procedural factor, that is, "the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
182 For an explanation of why undocumented initially arriving aliens are grouped to-
gether with initially arriving, nonimmigrant visaholders, see supra note 180.
183 Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 34.
184 See, e.g., Rafeedie v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 880 F.2d 506, 525 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (articulating the government's interest in Eldridge balancing as "the interests of
the Government, on behalf of the public, in summarily excluding terrorists and other un-
desirables from our shores and in avoiding the cost of additional safeguards"); Hamaya v.
McElroy, 797 F. Supp. 186, 193 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (failing to mention plenary power as part
of government's interest); Rafeedie v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 795 F. Supp. 13,
19-20 (D.D.C. 1992) (failing to acknowledge plenary power of political branches in area of
immigration regulation as part of government interest).
185 See infra text accompanying notes 220-21.
186 See supra Part Ill.
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used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute proce-
dural safeguards."' 8 7 This factor remains constant for all alien groups
subject to expedited removal for two reasons: (1) the two grounds of
inadmissibility that trigger expedited removal are identical for all
alien groups; and (2) the same procedure is applied to all alien
groups subject to expedited removal. 188 Given that the expedited re-
moval procedure vests the decision of admissibility in the hands of an
individual immigration inspector, and that the law bars administrative
and judicial review of the inspector's determination, 189 the risk of er-
roneous deprivation and the value of additional procedures is high.
One could argue that the grounds for expedited removal-lack of
documents or fraud-require simple, straightforward determinations
whose accuracy would not improve with increased procedures. 190
This argument has three flaws. First, the determinations can be com-
plicated.' 91 Second, anecdotal evidence has already demonstrated
that inspectors do make mistakes in their determinations of whether
aliens should be expeditiously removed.192 Third, the existing proce-
dures fail to provide any safeguard against arbitrary action by immi-
187 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
188 See supra Part IIA. Remember that this Note deals only with those aliens for whom
no administrative or judicial review is available. See supra notes 32, 35-36.
189 See supra Part II.A The Immigration and Naturalization Service has superimposed
extra procedural safeguards over the minimal statutory procedures. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 235.3(b) (7) (1998) (providing that "[a]ny [expedited] removal order entered by an ex-
amining immigration officer... must be reviewed and approved by the appropriate super-
visor before the order is considered final," and that "[s]uch supervisory review shall not be
delegated below the level of second line supervisor").
190 Cf. Aleinikoff, supra note 130, at 247 (stating that, for undocumented aliens, "an-
other of the [Eldridge] factors applies...: the likelihood that alternative procedures will
produce fewer errors").
191 See, e.g., 2 GORDON ET AL., supra note 19, § 71.04[2] [a] [ii] [B] (describing a number
of different tests for determining whether misrepresentation is material under immigra-
tion laws).
192 NewYork Times columnist Anthony Lewis describes the case of Meng Li, a Chinese
executive holding a U.S. nonimmigrant business visa. Anthony Lewis, It Can Happen Here,
N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 8, 1997, at A19. Li had visited the United States twice before under her
visa, and sought to enter a third time to conduct additional business. See id. In Anchorage,
Alaska, the immigration officer determined that Li was attempting to enter the country by
fraud or with improper documents. See id. The inspector apparently based his determina-
tion on the fact that Li had applied for, and been denied, another type of visa the previous
winter. See id. However, Li's other visa was still valid, and as noted by Li's attorney, "it is
legal for an alien coming here to use a valid visa when another has been denied, so long as
the alien uses it for the designated purpose." Id. Beyond making an apparently erroneous
legal determination, the inspector based that decision on erroneous factual information:
the Immigration and Naturalization Service had approved Li's new visa following its origi-
nal denial before Li arrived in Anchorage. See id. Li's story shows that a host of factors can
cause an erroneous decision to expeditiously remove an alien, and that the additional
supervisory review that the regulations superimpose, see supra note 189, does not necessar-
ily reduce such errors.
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gration inspectors. 193 Given this potential for both error and abuse,
additional procedures would clearly improve accuracy.
In sum, Eldridge balancing concludes, on the alien's side of the
balance, that the individual's interest is medium or low (depending
on the type of initial entrant), and the procedural factor is high. On
the government's side of the balance, assuming that a court will im-
port plenary power to favor the government a la Plasencia, the govern-
ment's interest is high. For initial entrants holding immigrant visas,
the combined individual and procedural factors (medium and high,
respectively) outweigh the high government interest, leading to the
conclusion that the procedure is unconstitutional. For nonimmigrant
initial entrants (and undocumented entrants), who have a low per-
sonal interest, the constitutionality of the expedited removal proce-
dure is a closer call. In the end, the Court is likely to determine that
the significant weight of the government's interest in regulating immi-
gration, along with the low degree of individual interest, makes the
expedited removal procedure constitutional as applied to initially ar-
riving, nonimmigrant aliens.' 94
2. As Applied to Returning Aliens' 95
The previous subsection's analysis simplifies the examination of
the expedited removal procedure as applied to returning aliens. First,
we know that the government's interest in maintaining the existing
procedures-especially with the importation of plenary power-is
high. Second, we know that the risk of erroneous deprivation and the
benefit of additional procedures are also high. Thus, the pivotal fac-
193 Columnist Anthony Lewis describes the psychology of immigration inspectors, and
the resulting potential for abuse:
[M]istreatment [of aliens seeking admission] seems to reflect an endemic
problem in the I.N.S. Like policemen hardened by the viciousness they see
in criminals, some immigration agents generalize from fraudulent aliens to
a skepticism of all. The great power given to individual agents by the new
law increases the chance of abuse.
Anthony Lewis, Vigilance and Fairness, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 22, 1997, at A27. Again, the supervi-
sory review that the regulations impose, see supra note 189, does little to prevent arbitrary
decisions, because the supervisor may share the same biases as the examining inspector, or
may base his or her determination on facts that the initial inspector has provided.
194 This result is contrary to the conclusion of stake theorist David Martin:
[I]n most circumstances, aliens at the threshold of entry probably may in-
sist upon the following- an unbiased decision-maker, notice of the proceed-
ings and of the general grounds asserted by the government for denial of
admission; a meaningful opportunity to dispute or overcome those
grounds, orally or in writing; and a statement of reasons, even if oral and
summary, for any adverse decision.
Martin, supra note 11, at 218 (footnotes omitted).
195 For a discussion of which aliens constitute "returning aliens" for purposes of this
Note, see supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
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tor for returning aliens in the Eldridge analysis is the individual
interest.
Unlike the group of initially arriving aliens, the returning alien
group includes only nonimmigrant visaholders.196 Returning aliens
(i.e., nonimmigrants) have a greater interest at stake than their ini-
tially arriving, nonimmigrant counterparts for the following reason.
Returning aliens are distinguishable from initially arriving nonimmi-
grants because they have been admitted to the country before. Thus,
like the returning resident alien in Plasencia, returning nonimmigrant
aliens, by virtue of their prior legal presence in the United States, have
had the opportunity to establish ties with the United States. 97
Although these ties do not reach the same level as those of the perma-
nent resident, they can nevertheless be strong, as illustrated by the
previously discussed story of John Psaropoulos.198 Thus, we can char-
acterize the stake of the returning alien as medium., This higher stake
makes the expedited removal procedure unconstitutional as applied
to returning nonimmigrant aliens, because the individual's interest
and the procedural factor (medium and high, respectively) outweigh
the government's interest (high).
3. As Applied to Present Aliens' 99
As with the analyses in the previous two subsections, the high gov-
ernment interest in maintaining the existing procediire, and the high
risk of erroneous deprivation in conjunction with the high value of
additional procedures, create a deadlock. Thus, the individual inter-
est is the dispositive factor in the Eldridge balancing. Unfortunately,
quantifying this factor is a difficult task. Stake theorist David Martin
makes the broad argument that all aliens who enter without inspec-
tion and admission should be treated for constitutional purposes as
first-time applicants.200 Coupling Martin's approach with the previous
analysis of initially arriving aliens, present aliens' ties to the commu-
nity would be low.201
196 Immigrant visaholders, once admitted, become permanent resident aliens, see
ALEiNmno ET AL., supra note 107, at 425-26, and thus fall outside the purview of the
barebones expedited removal procedure. See supra note 32. Undocumented aliens, who
were also included in the initially arriving category, could not have been admitted to the
United States previously because they lacked documents, and thus cannot be returning
aliens as that phrase is used in this Note.
197 See Martin, supra note 11, at 191-92 (distinguishing, for procedural due process
purposes, "regular nonimmigrants who have been among us for awhile" from first-time
applicants for admission).
198 See supra notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
199 For a discussion of which aliens constitute "present aliens" for purposes of this
Note, see supra notes 23, 25-26 and accompanying text.
200 Martin, supra note 11, at 230-34.
201 Present aliens would not have immigrant or nonimmigrant visas, so they would be
assimilated to the status of undocumented initial entrants. See supra note 180.
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However, Martin's position has problems. On a fundamental
level, one could argue that a present alien can acquire significant ties
to the United States. Such an alien might be employed (albeit ille-
gally), and have a family, friends, and property in the United States.
To completely ignore these ties would propagate a legal fiction.20 2 In-
deed, by limiting the application of the expedited removal to present
aliens who have been in the United States less than two years,20 3 Con-
gress arguably implicitly acknowledged that present residents who
have been in the United States longer than two years can establish ties
sufficient to justify additional process in removal proceedings.
Furthermore, when Martin proffers his position on clandestine
entrants, he assumes that all aliens, including initially arriving aliens,
are entitled to more process than the expedited removal procedure
provides.204 Unfortunately, as this stake analysis indicates, courts may
not agree that initially arriving aliens deserve more process. Using the
above stake theory analysis for arriving nonimmigrants, Martin's argu-
ment could lead to a conclusion that he would likely deem unaccept-
able: physically present aliens subject to expedited removal are
entitled to no additional process.
Martin's position appears to be driven, at least in part, by concern
about an inconsistency in the traditional, territorial framework.20 5
Commentators point out that under the traditional approach, the
clandestine entrant who is caught two hours after sneaking into the
country is entitled to due process, but the initial entrant who abides by
the rules is entitled only to whatever process Congress deems fit. 20 6 In
identifying the inconsistency, stake theorists present an example most
favorable to their position. Examples far less favorable to stake theo-
rists' positions do exist. Imagine a present alien who has been here
for one year and 364 days, and who has managed, through menial
labor, to support his or her spouse, child, and elderly grandparent
and who, during his or her time here, has developed strong relation-
ships with individuals in the United States. Should that individual be
202 Commentators, in turn, have criticized immigration law concepts, such as the "en-
try fiction," that employ the same sort of metaphysical classifications. See, e.g., Weisselberg,
supra note 11, at 953-54 (discussing the entry fiction and the parole power).
203 See supra text accompanying note 34.
204 Martin, supra note 11, at 218-19 (discussing minimum procedures that due process
mandates for first-time applicants for admission).
205 Id. at 230 ("Indeed, to give [clandestine entrants] a better procedural position
would only perpetuate the most glaring anomaly of the Knauff-Mezei doctrine. Such a re-
sult is not required.") (footnote omitted). For an articulation of that anomaly, see infra
text accompanying note 206.
206 See, e.g., ALEINiKOFF ET AL., supra note 107, at 629-30.
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treated the same as a first-time applicant for admission for constitu-
tional purposes? 20 7
Given the realities of the situation, a better, and more probable,
solution would recognize that present aliens have ties to the country
sufficient to qualify as medium personal interests in Eldridge balanc-
ing.2 08 Under such an approach, the Eldridge balance comes out in
favor of additional process for present aliens (medium personal inter-
est plus the high procedural factor outweigh the high government
interest).
In sum, under the stake theory, the expedited removal procedure
is unconstitutional as applied to returning, initially arriving immi-
grant, and present aliens. The only group that may not be able to
mount a successful due process attack on the expedited removal pro-
cedure is initially arriving nonimmigrant aliens. Having applied the
stake theory, the next Section explores the value of the stake theory in
terms of the results the theory provides and its method of analysis.
D. The Value of the Stake Theory
The stake theory is a marked improvement over the Supreme
Court's traditional approach to aliens' due process claims in terms of
both constitutional conclusions and method of analysis. From the
standpoint of conclusions, the stake theory provides more due process
protection than the traditional, territorial theory. Some may immedi-
ately ask: "Why is more protection necessarily better?" One need look
no further than the scant procedures of the new law's expedited re-
moval provisions to find the answer. The expedited removal proce-
dure provides virtually no protection against erroneous or arbitrary
determinations of individual immigration inspectors.20 9 Of course, ef-
ficiency considerations warrant admission and removal procedures
that fall short of full, adjudicatory-type hearings.210 However, fairness
requires some process. The stake theory, unlike the traditional ap-
proach, ensures that most aliens will receive some process in addition
207 If the Court really wants to avoid the inconsistency that irks stake theorists, then the
Court should simply say that present aliens, as clandestine entrants, do not have any liberty
or property interest because, assuming that they have no documentation (i.e., visa), they
can have no justified, statutorily based expectation that they are entitled to enjoy the fruits
of their time spent in the United States. See supra note 167; supra text accompanying note
168.
208 This solution is "more probable" because, by adopting such an approach, the Court
would maintain the pre-IIRIRA state of constitutional law for present aliens, that is, that
they, due to their status as deportable, are entitled to due process protection. See, e.g.,
supra text accompanying note 68.
209 See, e.g., supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
210 SeeMartin, supra note 11, at 180-82 (suggesting that the sheer number of applicants
for admission should affect procedural considerations).
1998] 853
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
to the unreviewable determination of an individual immigration
inspector.
The real allure of the stake theory, however, is its improved
method of analysis. For years, immigration law has been a wart on the
face of mainstream constitutional law. Almost thirty-five years ago, at
the height of the plenary power rhetoric, Henry Hart tagged the tradi-
tional, territorial approach as "patently preposterous."21' The stake
theory vastly improves on this method of analysis. Rather than cate-
gorically deferring to the determinations of Congress as the tradi-
tional approach does, the stake theory engages in a more nuanced
analysis of aliens' due process claims. By doing so, the stake theory
makes immigration law comport with contemporary, mainstream due
process doctrine,2 1 2 and forces court opinions addressing aliens' due
process claims to be "intellectually respectable." 213
At this point, traditionalists may sound their alarms and shout
that the stake theory will completely undermine the political
branches' power to regulate immigration.2 14 A number of factors sug-
gest that these alarmists should calm down. First, the political
branches will continue to have authority over immigration regulation.
The stake theory simply means that this power, like all other govern-
ment powers, will be subject to judicial review for constitutional viola-
tions.215 Second, as a number of commentators have noted, the
political question doctrine is available to provide the appropriate level
of judicial deference to political branch immigration actions when
those actions involve thorny matters of foreign policy.216 Third, given
the likely importation of the plenary power doctrine into the govern-
ment's side of the Eldridge balance,21 7 courts will continue to give
weight to the political branches' power in immigration regulation.2 18
211 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 H~Auv. L. Rzv. 1362, 1392 (1953).
212 For a discussion of the division between immigration law's traditional due process
framework and the Court's general contemporary due process doctrine, see supra Part V..
213 Hart, supra note 211, at 1395; see also Motomura, supra note 46, at 1704 (stating that
the abandonment of the plenary power doctrine would make courts "reach their results in
a more reasoned and deliberate way").
214 See, e.g., Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 1010 ("A more troublesome criticism is that
bringing all immigrants within the reach of the Due Process Clause, and affording judicial
review, would diminish the executive's power over foreign affairs.").
215 See Aleinikoff, supra note 130, at 870-71 ("Other congressional powers have flour-
ished ... despite thejudiciary's active and creative development of constitutional rights on
behalf of individuals and groups. There is no reason that immigration law cannot thrive
within the constitutional boundaries established for other delegated and implied federal
powers.").
216 See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 13, at 261-63; Weisselberg, supra note 11, at 1011-20.
217 See supra text accompanying notes 183-85.
218 Indeed, Part V.C's conclusion that the expedited removal procedure is unconstitu-
tional as applied to most aliens is not an indication that the stake theory equals judicial
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Whether the Court's expected importation of plenary power into
the stake theory is desirable bears addressing. The weight that courts
give to plenary power in Eldridge balancing will play a large role in the
substantive impact of the new theory. If courts use plenary power as
an insurmountable weight on the government's side of the Eldridge
balance, then adoption of the stake theory will be a change only in
form, and not in substance. If, on the other hand, the plenary power
doctrine's extreme form of judicial deference fades from judicial
memory, and plenary power becomes merely another factor to weigh
in Eldridge balancing, then the adoption of the stake theory will gener-
ate the positive conclusions and methodological shift discussed
above.21 9
Initially, the Court's use of plenary power in the Eldridge balance
may be prudent for two reasons. First, such an approach best com-
ports with the language of Eldridge, which directs courts to consider
"the [governmental] function involved" when calculating the govern-
ment's interest.220 Given that the function involved is an area in
which the political branches have traditionally enjoyed unfettered reg-
ulatory power, some additional weight on the government's side of
the balance is appropriate. Second, the use of plenary power on the
government's side of the balance will reduce the risk that courts will
overreact when they begin to adjudicate aliens' due process claims. T.
Alexander Aleinikoff articulates the risk, and the cost of such judicial
overreaction, as follows:
In most areas of law, constitutional due process has developed
as a dialogue between the courts and the other branches of govern-
ment. As notions of what constitutes fundamental fairness have
evolved over time, the courts have "persuaded" legislators and ad-
ministrators to add procedural protections when important liberty
or property interests are at stake....
This growth of process is less likely when the Supreme Court
announces that it has no role to play.... The clear signal of Knauff
and Mezei is that the government is free-at least as to initial en-
trants and undocumented aliens at the border-to provide the pro-
cedures it deems appropriate. Given [efficiency considerations], it
is not unreasonable to assume that Congress will opt for less rather
than more process. More importantly, the border officials will
search for ways to avoid the procedures that Congress mandates.
Lower courts will obey Knauff and Mezei for a long time, lead-
ing government officials down the garden path. But when the gov-
activism. Rather, it is a testament to the total lack of procedural protection provided under
the expedited removal provisions.
219 See supra text accompanying notes 209-13.
220 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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ernment conduct becomes so outrageous, so obviously unfair,
federal judges will put a stop to it. In attempting to do so, however, they
will not be able to simply add another flower in the garden of due process,
because due process has never taken root at the border. Thus the courts [will
be] forced to leap in with both feet, demanding costly and intrusive proce-
dures that make control of the borders and deportation of aliens considerably
more difficult.
This is hardly a healthy way for due process to grow .... 221
By incorporating plenary power into the balance, courts will be less
likely to "leap in with both feet, demanding costly and intrusive proce-
dures."222 Thus, the due process dialogue will have a better chance of
developing smoothly and more efficiently. Remember, however, that
for the stake theory to have any substantive impact, plenary power
cannot act as a two-ton weight on the Eldridge scale.
In summary, the IIRIRA provides the opportunity to jettison the
traditional approach in favor of the far more desirable stake theory.
As the application of the theory shows, the implementation of the the-
ory will require more effort from courts, for they will have to work
through a balance of competing interests in order to determine
whether procedures are fair. This increased responsibility, however, is
no reason to shy away from the stake theory. After all, courts already
engage in such a balancing exercise to resolve the due process claims
of citizens and permanent residents. To allow courts to do anything
less for alien claims is to ignore the language of the Due Process
Clause, which unequivocally protects persons.
VI
ANALYSIS OF THE SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTION OF ANY
EXPEDITIOUSLY REMOVED ALIEN UNDER U z.V_
ST.TAES V MzVzozA-LopEz 223
The previous Parts analyzed the IIRIRA's expedited removal pro-
cedure, and argued that the procedure provides the Court with an
ideal opportunity to change its analytical approach to aliens' due pro-
cess claims. In so doing, the previous Parts noted that the Court's
traditional, territorial approach treats some aliens as nonpersons
under the Due Process Clause.
This Part shifts the focus of the Note to the subsequent prosecu-
tion of any alien who has violated an expedited removal order. The
221 Aleinikoff, supra note 130, at 258-59 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
222 Id. Note that plenary power importation creates immediate casualties: initially ar-
riving nonimmigrants may be unable to raise a successful due process claim against the
procedures. See supra Part V.C.l. Hopefully, as judicial memory of plenary power fades,
the weight afforded to plenary power will decrease, and the stark expedited removal proce-
dures will become unacceptable as applied to arriving nonimmigrants.
223 481 U.S. 828 (1987) [hereinafter Mendoza-Lopez I].
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analysis reveals that at the moment the government attempts to prose-
cute an alien, the person/nonperson distinction of immigration law's
traditional due process approach falls away. Under the Supreme
Court's holding in United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, any alien who is pros-
ecuted for the violation of an expedited removal procedure is a per-
son entitled to protection under the Due Process Clause.224 As
established below, by coupling a bar on collateral attacks with a bar on
judicial review, the subsequent prosecution procedure violates an
alien's due process rights.
A. United States v. Mendoza-Lopez
1. Facts and Procedural History
In Mendoza-Lopez, two Mexican nationals were charged with re-
turning to the United States following their deportation in violation of
8 U.S.C. § 1326.225 The defendants pled the invalidity of the prior
deportation order as a defense in the § 1326 prosecution. 226 After
ruling that the defendants could collaterally attack their previous de-
portation orders in the § 1326 prosecution, the district court dis-
missed the indictments, concluding that the defendants "had not
made knowing and intelligent waivers of their rights to apply for sus-
pension of deportation or their rights to appeal. '227
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit acknowledged a circuit split on the issue of whether an alien
could collaterally attack the validity of a deportation order in a § 1326
prosecution. 228 In affirming the District Court's dismissal, the Eighth
Circuit sided with those circuits that had read into § 1326 a require-
ment that the deportation order be "lawful."229 Under this reading,
the subsequent prosecution statute itself provided a basis for collateral
attack of the underlying deportation order.23 0
The Court of Appeals also based its holding on notions of funda-
mental fairness. 231 The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court
that the deportation proceedings had violated due process, stating
that, "[b]ecause the defendants did not fully understand the proceed-
224 Id. at 837-39 (holding that due process guarantees an alien some form ofjudicial
review of deportation order before that order can be used in a criminal prosecution for
violation of the order).
225 Id. at 830.
226 See id. at 831 ("They contended that the Immigration Law Judge inadequately in-
formed them of their right to counsel at the hearing, and accepted their unknowing waiv-
ers of the right to apply for suspension of deportation.").
227 Id. at 831-32.
228 United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 781 F.2d 111, 112 (8th Cir. 1985) [hereinafter
Mendoza-Lopez 1], affld Mendoza-Lopez I, 481 U.S. at 828 (1987).
229 Id.
230 See id.
231 Id. at 113.
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ings, the hearing was fundamentally unfair, and the deportation order
was obtained unlawfully. Thus, it cannot stand as a material element
forming the basis of the charges against the defendants." 232 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the split among the
circuits.
23 3
2. Holding
The Supreme Court held that some form of judicial review of a
deportation order must be available before that order can be used "to
establish an element of a criminal offense."234 The Court explicitly
answered the collateral attack question by stating that "[d] epriving an
alien of the right to have the disposition in a deportation hearing re-
viewed in a judicial forum requires, at a minimum," that the alien be
able to collaterally attack the deportation order in the subsequent
§ 1326 prosecution. 235
3. Rationale
Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall began by framing the
issue of the case. After acknowledging that the Court was addressing a
question left open almost forty years earlier in United States v.
Spector,23 6 he stated:
Today, we squarely confront this question in the context of § 1326,
which imposes a criminal penalty on any alien who has been de-
ported and subsequently enters, attempts to enter, or is found in,
the United States. The issue before us is whether a federal court
must always accept as conclusive the fact of the deportation order,
even if the deportation proceeding was not conducted in conform-
ity with due process. 237
Justice Marshall went on to conclude that nothing in the lan-
guage or history of § 1326 suggested that the statute itself provided for
collateral attack on the validity of the underlying deportation order in
a § 1326 prosecution.238 In so holding, the Court rejected the "lawful"
deportation requirement that the Eighth Circuit had read into
§ 1326.239 Congressional intent, however, would not control the ulti-
mate disposition of the case. 240
232 Id.
233 Mendoza-Lopez 11, 481 U.S. at 833.
234 Id. at 839.
235 Id.
236 343 U.S. 169 (1952).
237 Mendoza-Lopez -, 481 U.S. at 833-34.
238 Id. at 834-37.
239 See id. at 834-35.
240 See id. at 837 ("That Congress did not intend the validity of the deportation order
to be contestable in a § 1326 prosecution does not end our inquiry.").
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Moving on to constitutional considerations, Justice Marshall de-
clared that a statute that allows a court to impose "a criminal penalty
for reentry after any deportation, regardless of how violative of the
rights of the alien the deportation proceeding may have been.., does
not comport with the constitutional requirement of due process."241
After expressing concern over any scheme that allows criminal prose-
cution for violation of an administrative order and bars collateral at-
tack of that order in the criminal proceeding, Marshall stated that, "at
a minimum, the result of an administrative proceeding may not be
used as a conclusive element of a criminal offense where the judicial
review that legitimated such a practice in the first instance has effec-
tively been denied."242
Having established the rule of law, Justice Marshall applied it to
the facts of the case. 243 He concluded that the violation of the aliens'
due process rights in the deportation proceeding "amounted to a
complete deprivation of judicial review of the determination" of de-
portability.244 Thus, he continued, the government could not use the
deportation order to establish an element of the § 1326 offense. 245
241 Id.
242 Id. at 838 n.15.
243 Id. at 839-40.
244 Id. at 840.
245 Id. Justice Marshall appears to have resolved two issues at once. Rather than sepa-
rately determining (1) whetherjudicial review had been effectively denied, thus requiring
collateral attack; and (2) the merits of the collateral attack, that is, whether the underlying
deportation order was valid and could thus be used as an element of the § 1326 crime,
Marshall determined that because judicial review had been completely denied, the govern-
ment could not use the deportation order as an element of the § 1326 crime. Id.
This conflation has led to inconsistent applications of Mendoza-Lopez among the cir-
cuits. The majority of circuits have held that an alien must make two showings in order to
mount a successful collateral attack on a deportation order in a subsequent prosecution:
"[Tihe alien must show not only that he was effectively deprived of his right of direct
appeal, but also that the administrative proceedings were fundamentally unfair in some
respect that would have entitled him to relief on direct appeal." United States v. Fares, 978
F.2d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1992). The Eighth Circuit, however, has held that effective denial of
judicial review in the deportation proceeding is alone sufficient grounds for barring the
use of the order in a § 1326 prosecution. United States v. Santos-Vanegas, 878 F.2d 247,
252 (8th Cir. 1989). Some commentators have argued that the Eighth Circuit's holding is
correct, and that the other circuits are imposing an additional burden on aliens contrary to
the Court's holding in Mendoza-Lopez. See, e.g., Noble F. Allen, Note, Habeas Corpus and
Immigration: Important Issues and Developments, 4 GEO. IMMR. L.J. 503, 535 (1990) (stating
that "[the two-step approach] is unsupported by precedent; nowhere in the Supreme
Court's decision is there a two-step approach for determining whether an alien can collat-
erally attack a prior deportation proceeding").
Notwithstanding Justice Marshall's consolidation of the issues, the approach of the
majority of the circuits appears intuitively correct. To say that an alien can collaterally
attack a deportation order in a subsequent prosecution is different from saying that the
order is invalid. Rather, allowing the alien to collaterally attack the deportation order
means that the alien can question the validity of the order in the subsequent prosecution.
Justice Marshall's consolidation of the issues was probably prompted by the government's
request that the Court "assume that respondents' deportation hearing was fundamentally
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In the final section of the majority opinion, Justice Marshall went
to great lengths to distinguish the circumstances of Lewis v. United
States24 6 from the situation presented in Mendoza-Lopez. Justice Mar-
shall explained that in Lewis, the Court held that "Congress may con-
stitutionally make it a felony for convicted felons-irrespective of the
legality of their convictions-to deal in or possess firearms."247 The
government argued by analogy that Lewis established the constitution-
ality of the procedure at issue.248 Justice Marshall identified a sharp
distinction between the two cases: the convicted felon in Lewis, unlike
the alien in Mendoza-Lopez, had means available for obtaining judicial
review of the prior conviction.249 Thus, Lewis served to drive home
the majority's holding:
What was assumed in Lewis, namely the opportunity to challenge
the predicate conviction in a judicial forum, was precisely that
which was denied to respondents here. Persons charged with
crime Es] are entitled to have the factual and legal determinations
upon which the convictions are based subjected to the scrutiny of
an impartial judicial officer. Lewis does not reject that basic princi-
ple, and our decision today merely reaffirms it.25 0
4. Dissents
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded that "there may be
exceptional circumstances where the Due Process Clause prohibits the
Government from using an alien's prior deportation as a basis for...
liability under § 1326," he argued that "respondents have fallen far
short of establishing such exceptional circumstances here."251 He spe-
cifically disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the aliens had
been completely denied their right to appeal.2 52 By so disagreeing,
the Chief Justice sidestepped the collateral attack issue because the
majority's holding assumed that the aliens had been effectively denied
judicial review in the deportation proceeding. Rehnquist would have
allowed use of the prior deportation orders against the aliens in the
§ 1326 prosecution.253
In a separate dissent, Justice Scalia directly disputed the Court's
holding that due process requires an opportunity for the alien to at-
unfair in considering whether collateral attack on the hearing may be permitted." Men-
doza-Lopez i, 481 U.S. at 839-40.
246 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
247 Mendoza-LopezE , 481 U.S. at 847 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Lewis v. United
States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980)).
248 See id. at 840-41.
249 Id. at 841.
250 Id. at 841-42.
251 Id. at 842 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
252 Id at 844-45 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
253 Id. at 846 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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tack the unreviewable deportation order in the subsequent prosecu-
tion: "[N] either Lewis nor any of the other cases relied upon by the
Court squarely holds that the Due Process Clause invariably forbids
reliance upon the outcome of unreviewable administrative determina-
tions in subsequent criminal proceedings."254 Alternatively, Justice
Scalia stated that even if he did think the availability ofjudicial review
was relevant for due process purposes, the present facts did not estab-
lish the unavailability of such review. 25 5 He stated that "[t]here is a
world of difference ... between denial of a right to appeal and failure
to assure that parties understand the available grounds for appeal and
forgo them in a 'considered' fashion."256 Like Rehnquist, Justice
Scalia would have upheld the aliens' convictions. 257
B. Application of Mendoza-Lopez to the IIRIRA's Expedited
Removal and Subsequent Prosecution Procedure
The IIRIRA's provisions authorizing the subsequent prosecution
for the violation of an expedited removal order are unconstitutional.
Given that expedited removal orders are not judicially reviewable,
Mendoza-Lopez establishes that the alien must be able to collaterally
attack the validity of the underlying deportation order in the subse-
quent § 1326 prosecution.258 The IIRIRA's fatal flaw is that it bars
collateral attack of the expedited removal order in the subsequent
prosecution.25 9 Thus, the subsequent prosecution procedure runs
counter to the express constitutional holding in Mendoza-Lopez: "[A]
collateral challenge to the use of a deportation proceeding as an ele-
ment of a criminal offense must be permitted where the deportation
proceeding effectively eliminates the right of the alien to obtain judi-
cial review."260
Any grounds for distinguishing the subsequent prosecution pro-
cedures of the IIRIRA from the facts of Mendoza-Lopez magnify, rather
than reduce, the due process violation. Mendoza-Lopez involved an is-
sue of waiver: the alien alleged, and the Court agreed, that the aliens
had been "effectively [denied] the right ... to obtain judicial re-
view."261 In contrast, the IIRIRA's scheme itself expressly precludes
judicial review of the expedited removal order.262 The majority hold-
254 Id. at 848 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
255 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
256 Id. at 849 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
257 See id. at 850 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
258 See supra text accompanying notes 234-35.
259 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
260 Mendoza-Lopez H, 481 U.S. at 839.
261 Id. at 835.
262 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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ing in Mendoza-Lopez clearly indicates that the IIRIRA's bar on collat-
eral attacks violates the alien's due process rights.
Furthermore, the distinction between the waiver situation in Men-
doza-Lopez and the statutory denial of collateral attacks under the
IIRIRA should capture the votes of Chief Justice Rehnquist and his
fellow dissenters.2 63 Given that the lack ofjudicial review is a product
of the statute, 264 Chief Justice Rehnquist loses his argument that the
aliens did not necessarily suffer from a denial of their right to ap-
peal.265 Indeed, the aliens have no right to appeal under the present
scheme. Without that basis for dissent, ChiefJustice Rehnquist would
have to concede that the IIRIRA's subsequent prosecution scheme
creates an "exceptional circumstance [ ] where the Due Process Clause
prohibits the Government from using an alien's prior [order] as a
basis for imposing criminal liability under § 1326."266
The distinction between waiver of appeal and a complete bar also
weakens Justice Scalia's argument. He states:
[E]ven if I believed the availability of "effective judicial review"
to be relevant .... [t]here is a world of difference . . . between
denial of a right to appeal and failure to assure that parties under-
stand the available grounds for appeal and forgo them in a "consid-
ered" fashion.267
Because the IIRIRA's scheme provides no right to appeal, Justice
Scalia is left with the argument that the Due Process Clause does not
"invariably forbid[ ] reliance upon the outcome of unreviewable ad-
ministrative determinations in subsequent criminal proceedings."268
The characteristics of the expedited removal scheme take away that
argument from Justice Scalia as well. In attempting to refute the ma-
jority holding, Justice Scalia sets out the following hypothetical:
[I]magine that a State establishes an administrative agency that (af-
ter investigation and full judicial-type administrative hearings) periodi-
cally publishes a list of unethical businesses.... [T]he State, having
discovered that a number of previously listed businesses are bribing
the agency's investigators to avoid future listing, passes a law making
it a felony for a business ihat has been listed to bribe agency investi-
gators. It cannot be said that the Due Process Clause forbids the
State to punish violations of that law unless it either makes the
agency's listing decisions judicially reviewable or permits those
263 Justice Rehnquist wrote in dissent forJustices White and O'Connor. Mendoza-Lopez
II, 481 U.S. at 842.
264 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
265 See supra text accompanying note 252.
266 Mendoza-Lopez HI, 481 U.S. at 842 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
267 Id. at 848-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
268 Id. at 848 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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charged with violating the law [to collaterally attack the validity of
the listing]. 269
Justice Scalia's hypothetical assumes that the agency listing upon
which the subsequent prosecution is based results from "investigation
and fill judicial-type administrative hearings."270 For Justice Scalia,
those procedures in the original proceeding serve as a sufficient proxy
forjudicial procedures, thusjustifying the use of the original findings
as a conclusive element in a subsequent criminal prosecution. Unfor-
tunately, the expedited removal procedure provides anything but full
judicial-type administrative hearings. The sharp contrast between the
stark expedited removal procedure and the full hearing procedure
thatJustice Scalia describes in his hypothetical suggests that he would
be unwilling to find that those procedures are a satisfactory proxy for
judicial procedures. In other words, he would find the IIRIRA's bar
on collateral attacks unconstitutional.
One may argue that the distinction between the prior proceed-
ings cuts in favor of the constitutionality of the IIRIRA's subsequent
prosecution procedure. In making such an argument, one would
posit that the aliens in Mendoza-Lapez were denied judicial review to
which they had a right, while aliens under the IIRIRA have no such
right, and are thus not deprived of due process. However, this argu-
ment fundamentally misinterprets the source of the due process
rights. Although the Court in Mendoza-Lopez is somewhat cryptic in its
due process references, Justice Jackson clearly identified the source of
the rights thirty-five years earlier in United States v. Spector:271 "[Tihe
alien ... stands on an equal constitutional footing with the citizen
when he is charged with crime."2 72 The criminal prosecution bestows
upon the alien full due process protections. Those due process rights
are violated when an element of a crime is conclusively established
without any means of judicial review. Without using due process lan-
guage, the majority in Mendoza-Lopez recognized the source of the due
process rights: "Persons charged with crime are entitled to have the
factual and legal determinations upon which convictions are based
subjected to the scrutiny of an impartial judicial officer."273 There-
269 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
270 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
271 343 U.S. 169 (1952).
272 Id. at 177 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
273 Mendoza-Lopiz H, 481 U.S. at 841-42. Commentators point to Mendoza-Lopez as an
example of a constitutional limit on Congress's power to limit the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts. See, e.g., PETER W. Low &JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAiW
OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 214 (3d ed. 1994); PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND
BYsE'S ADMnNsrTRATriv LAW: CASES AND COMMENTs 1223 (9th ed. 1995) (stating that "Men-
doza-Lopez present[s] the most compelling paradigm for recognizing a constitutional right
to judicial review of agency action") (italics added). The IIRIRA procedures, which inten-
tionally deny an alien any judicial review, arguably present a more alarming separation-of-
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fore, the IIRIRA's subsequent prosecution procedure cannot be
constitutional.
CONCLUSION
As Professor Stephen Legomsky aptly noted over a decade ago,
"Immigration law is a constitutional oddity."274 While individual right
flourished under what has been coined "the due process revolution,"
the plenary power doctrine prevented that revolution from com-
pletely reaching the area of aliens' due process rights. This is not to
say that constitutional immigration law has been totally static. The
landmark holding in Landon v. Plasencia suggests that the Court will
be unwilling to allow Congress to determine the constitutional status
of certain aliens. Furthermore, commentators have observed that
lower courts have for years been devising novel means of avoiding the
harshness of the plenary power doctrine.2 75
Into this anomalous landscape Congress has dropped the IIRIRA,
a law which one commentator has characterized as "the most diverse,
divisive, and draconian immigration law enacted since the Chinese Ex-
clusion Act of 1882."276 The obvious question asks whether the new
law will withstand constitutional attack. The answers, under tradi-
tional Supreme Court analysis, do not look promising for aliens sub-
ject to expedited removal. The procedure is clearly constitutional as
applied to initially arriving and returning aliens, and may be constitu-
tional as applied to present aliens. More disconcerting than the tradi-
tional approach's conclusions, however, is its method of analysis:
certain aliens are nonpersons under the due process clause.
Rather than accepting the traditional analysis, this Note argues
that the new law provides the Court with the ideal opportunity to
abandon the traditional approach in favor of an improved framework.
This new framework-the stake theory-makes all aliens persons
under the Due Process Clause. For most aliens, the adoption of the
stake theory will mean that the expedited removal procedure is un-
constitutional. Personhood, however, will not automatically mean ad-
ditional process for all aliens. Given the probable use of plenary
power in the Eldridge balance, courts will likely deem the barebones
expedited removal procedure constitutional as applied to at least
some initially arriving aliens. Putting aside the constitutional conclu-
sions, the real value of the stake theory lies in its improved method of
analysis. As Hiroshi Motomura observed, "[a]fter the demise of ple-
powers issue than Mendoza-Lope where the alien waived an existing right to judicial
process.
274 Legomsky, supra note 13, at 255.
275 See, e.g., Motomura, supra note 46, at 1628-30.
276 Danilov, supra note 4, at A19.
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nary power, judges in some immigration decisions might reach results
similar to those now compelled by the deferential stance required
under the present doctrine .... The critical difference, however,
would be that courts would reach their results in a more reasoned and
deliberate way."277
Returning to the specific provisions of the new law, the IIRIRA's
procedure for the subsequent prosecution of any alien who violates an
expedited removal procedure is dearly unconstitutional. Under the
Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, any alien
who is subject to criminal prosecution is a person under the Due Pro-
cess Clause, and is entitled to more process than the expedited re-
moval procedure provides.
We must remember that the Due Process Clause, by its own
terms, protects "persons." For over a century, immigration law has
ignored that restriction on government action, effectively making cer-
tain aliens nonpersons for due process purposes. The Supreme Court
in Mendoza-Lopez held that all aliens subject to subsequent prosecution
for the violation of a removal order are persons under the Due Pro-
cess Clause. This Note urges the Court to take the next step by recog-
nizing personhood for all aliens subject to removal from the United
States.
277 Motorura, supra note 46, at 1704.
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